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 ABSTRACT 
 
Title of dissertation: An analysis of the trend in concessions and privatisation   
in Ports: a case of Kenya and Tanzania. 
 
Degree:     MSc 
 
Privatisation and ports concessions are forging ahead all over the world, giving an 
enlarged role to the private sector in the management and operation of port facilities.  
This dissertation analyses the trends that privatisation and concessions are taking in 
world ports with a view to identifying the methods and reasons governments are 
increasingly adopting this concept.  At the same time its significance in port 
competitiveness is assessed while taking into account its efficacy as a universal 
panacea of problems in public ports.  
 
The author starts by analysing the concept “sea port” and defining the controversial 
term “privatisation”. Institutional reforms in the port industry are analysed pointing 
out the changes that have taken place during pre privatisation and post privatisation 
era and their reasons.  This culminates into a sequential analysis where present 
trends featuring port administrations and governments seeking bids from global 
private terminal operators and major ocean carriers are made.  Global operators’ 
dominance in port privatisation and a comparative study of Kenya and Tanzania 
container terminals is discussed in details.   This scenario is evident in almost all 
privatisation initiatives done through mainly concession and lease contracts. 
 
The conclusion shows that there is still room for privatisation in ports as more 
governments and port administrators are seeking international bids for port 
concessions and lease contracts; thus the trend is bound to continue in the 
foreseeable future.  While the analysis shows that port privatisation is a concept that 
has evolved to facilitate trade in a world where competition has become the 
universal norm, it is neither a universal panacea nor peril.  
 
KEY WORDS: Port Privatisation, Concessions, Lease Contracts, World Ports. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Consistent with the worldwide trend to privatise the operation and often the 
ownership of airports, highways, water supply, and wastewater treatment facilities, 
governments in developed and developing countries are turning over port 
operational responsibility and port assets to private enterprises.  In most cases, the 
public sector retains responsibility for essential statutory functions such as general 
navigational safety regulations and contract monitoring and enforcement.  In the 
global environment, the role of government is waning while that of the private sector 
is waxing.  
 
Port operations in developing countries have a history of being inefficient due to 
centralized bureaucratic management, high labour costs, obsolete equipment for 
handling high volumes of cargo, and various financial problems.  Pervasive 
inefficiencies in public ports in contrast to striking performance records of privately 
run terminals have gradually induced governments to reconsider the organization 
and management of their national port systems.  Governments of developing 
nations have eventually come to realize that the port-as-a-business concept can 
positively and significantly contribute to the national economy. 
 
Privatization of ports has increased competition in costs and encouraged 
autonomous investments and operations.  This has cemented the conviction that 
private participation is a universal panacea.  However, defining port privatisation is 
seldom easy and requires careful analysis.  This is because the extent of private 
sector involvement within ports can vary.   
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 1.2 Definition of the research problem 
 
Concessions and privatisation of public service ports is a vexed subject.  However, 
there are widespread trends of global strategies in vertical and horizontal integration 
evolving around port ownership and operations undertaken by a variety of market 
players, both within and outside the international shipping and logistics markets.  
 
Despite recent evidence of declining public support for privatization, the trend shows 
resounding success of privatisation in competitive sectors.  The author uses bids 
and awards of concession and lease contracts by governments and port 
administrators to global private terminal operators and shipping lines as indicators of 
privatisation activities. 
 
It is worth noting that the market environment in which ports operate has changed 
significantly.  Globalisation of trade and economies of scale have enticed shipping 
lines to opt for mega ships.  Also in order to improve terminal operation performance 
and to integrate door-to-door transport, many shipping lines want to expand their 
scope to include terminal operations.  
 
Since carriers view ships’ time at ports as an expensive activity, the speed of 
container handling and consequent vessel turnaround time is a crucial issue in 
terms of competitiveness for ports.  This is very important because ship owners 
have put to service mega ships like the current world’s biggest container ship, the 
MSC Pamela, of 9,200 TEU capacity (Reinikainen, 2006, p. 10).  News has it that 
from September 2006, Maersk will smash the world record with a new containership 
named Emma Maersk.  The real intake could be as much as 50% greater than the 
biggest ships now in service.  With seven tiers stacked on deck, and allowing for 
visibility rules, the ship could carry around 13,500 TEUs (Porter, 2006, p. 1) 
  
The potential trend for further significant port privatization programmes is also likely 
to fuel the continuing participation of shipping lines into container handling via the 
investments they are continuing to make in dedicated and multi-user terminals.  This 
is currently seen from shipping lines like Maersk line and others like CMA-CGM and 
MSC.  The continuation of the globalization policies of the major container terminal 
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 operators like Hutchison, PSA and Dubai Ports World and the further concentration 
of the sector are also likely to feature prominently in the industry’s future.  
 
The trend that port privatisation is taking can be clearly manifested by the apparent 
active participation of these global terminal operators.  Global terminal operators 
have taken advantage of liberalisation of the maritime sector to gain foothold in 
otherwise difficult markets through acquisitions and concession contracts.  DPWorld 
for example initially managed ports in the Middle East, Europe and India.  Its first 
project was at the Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia, where it collaborated with local 
partners on the operation of the South Container terminal.  Its involvement with 
Djibouti followed in January 2005 catapulting it on the world stage.  It later gained a 
foothold in Hong Kong, Tianjin and Yangtai in China and South Korea at the Pusan 
New Port, Australia, Germany, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.  Its 
ambitions like many other terminal operators and major ocean carriers continue to 
grow as will be revealed in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
The fundamental rationale for the trend however, is the emergence of logistics and 
supply chain management as mainstream concepts in business and the role of ports 
and transport generally being part of the link within the wider framework of a supply 
chain.   
 
1.3 Objectives and scope  
 
The purpose of this study is to highlight, analyse and offer recommendations on the 
trend of concessions and privatization of ports and the competitiveness that comes 
with it.  Critical analysis of the past, present and forecast for the future are made 
where the author believes concessions and privatization will be a common 
phenomenon.  In the research pertinent questions on the contemporary situation are 
posed in order to address the topic exhaustively.  These include: 
 
1. Is privatization and concession a solution for the present and the future?  Is it 
the universal panacea? 
2.  Are labour unions a bottleneck for port efficiency and private sector 
participation?  
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 3.  What role are global terminal operators and major ocean carriers playing in 
port privatisation today?  
4. What does the future hold for privatization and port concession?  
5. Is there a place for port authorities in privatised ports?  
 
1.4 Study Methodology:  
 
For materials gathering, analysis and data collection, the research relies heavily on 
literature survey and interviews conducted during port visits. 
 
The author depended entirely on literature searches, drawing from published 
material, networking with regional experts and Internet searches.  Much of the 
published literature presents specific country experiences, which are not directly 
comparable with global practices due to varying social, cultural, institutional and 
economic factors.  Instead, the findings are analysed and distilled into 'best practice' 
recommendations, which are applicable under broad conditions.  
 
Statistical analysis of data obtained from textbooks and World Bank privatisation 
database, peer reviewed literature and information from port visits were used to 
support the qualitative judgements.  Case studies are used to highlight specific 
country situations.  Visits to the European ports of France and Netherlands, Asian 
Port of Singapore and East African ports of Tanzania and Kenya laid the 
groundwork for a wider comparative analysis of the levels and trends of 
privatisation. 
 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
Efforts have been made to have a global representation of the literature and 
situations, and interviews at ports done during field study visits.  However as this 
work deals with worldwide assessment, it cannot pretend to be exhaustive.  There 
were difficulties in acquiring comprehensive data held by private port operators 
owing to official privacy and confidentiality. 
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 1.6 Summary  
 
In order to take fully into account the complexity of the trends in privatisation and 
concessions and the controversial viewpoints that will inevitably be encountered, 
this study uses a gradual approach, consisting of six interrelated chapters.  The first 
two chapters clarify the precise context in which privatisation and concession 
schemes are conceived and implemented.  This is done through an overview 
description of the concept “seaport”, highlighting its functions, activities and model 
management systems applied in ports in the world. 
 
Chapters 3 to 5 endeavour to elicit the critical factors, principles and the status quo 
in the port industry.  This is tackled through a detailed analytical discussion of the 
subject in a sequential analysis of trends in institutional framework changes, with 
specific examples of past and contemporary situation featuring port administrations 
and governments seeking bids from global private terminal operators and major 
ocean carriers.  Viewpoints from both proponents and critics are analysed and 
cases for and against the trend floated.  This part shows the reasons behind the 
great changes behind port management and operations.  It also critically tackles 
trends in port privatisation.  Case studies and country experiences are given to show 
the uniqueness of situations and approaches as well as to give further support and 
paraphrases of facts. 
 
While the author mainly relates to the question of the trend in port concessions and 
privatisation, it is worth noting that the participation of the private sector in the port 
industry proceeded at a pace adapted to the economic, political and social situation 
of given countries.  For example, the Kenyan and Tanzania cases are considered 
because of the much-contrasted paces in privatization taking cognizance of the fact 
that they are competing neighbouring ports.  Port performance indicators are used 
to illustrate and offer a comparative analysis.  
 
Ultimately chapter 6 arrives at a conclusion drawn from the empirical analysis of the 
research in light of the past, current and future prospects in the trend in privatisation. 
Though the recommendations should not be interpreted as an infallible set of recipe 
to be applied without due consideration, they are a guidance for port administrations 
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 and governments willing to involve private participants and also offer clarities of the 
port privatisation trend.  To take off one should as a prerequisite acquaint her/him by 
bearing in mind what the concept seaport means.  What is a seaport? The next 
chapter describes this and its attributes. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2 PORT INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Chapter one has given an overview of the need that has driven administrations all 
over the world today to opt for privatisation, but privatisation will not be a success 
without the means and tools to offer those private services.  This chapter will 
therefore analyse the infrastructure and superstructure available in ports and how 
various types of port management models operate in the process of offering port 
services.  The transition between public to public/private partnership is analysed 
showing the rationale and trend.  
 
Due to the growth in competition between ports, governments are reorganizing the 
way ports are run and permitting more private ownership and service delivery.  The 
potential for competition in providing these services depends largely on the assets 
required to provide them.  The economies of scale obtained by the transport of large 
quantities of containers have led to the building of larger and more specialized ships 
that require substantial port investments in new infrastructure and equipment to 
serve them. But to start with what is a seaport?  
 
2.2 Concept of a seaport 
 
Article 1 of the Geneva Convention on the international regime of maritime ports of 
9th December 1923, gives the definition “All ports which are normally frequented by 
sea-going vessels and used for foreign trade shall be deemed to be maritime ports”. 
 
Professor Alderton defines a port as a ship/shore or a maritime inter-modal 
interface.  Ports are areas where there are facilities for berthing or anchoraging 
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 ships and where there is the equipment for transfer of goods from ship to shore or 
shore to ship (Alderton, 1999, p. 2). 
 
A port is not only a tool, an interface between sea and land but also a logistical 
platform where many tasks are performed (Francou, 2003, p. 2).  Ports are vital in 
many aspect of our day-to-day life and a vital element of a national transport 
infrastructure.  They play a great role in trade.  World trade is growing faster than 
World GDP as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 and 2, and since 90% of this trade is 
carried by sea, ports are indispensable tools to sustain it. 
 
Table1: Growth in World trade against GDP 
 
Year 
 
 
1990- 
2000 
 
2000- 
2004 
 
2001 
 
2002 
 
2003 
 
2004 
Merchandise 
Exports Growth (%) 
 
6.4 
 
4.2 
 
-0.5 
 
4 
 
7 
 
13 
GDP at Market rate (%) 2.5 2.5 1.3 1.8 2.5 3.8 
GDP at PPP (%) 3.4 3.6 2.4 3.0 3.9 5.0 
Source: WTO and UNCTAD 2005 
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Figure 2 Growth in World trade against GDP 
Source: WTO and UNCTAD 2005 
 
From the statistics in Table 1 above, world economy deteriorated in 2001, 
particularly in the aftermath of the tragic events of 9/11.  Consumer and business 
confidence weakened everywhere, and global growth declined.  As the slow down 
affected nearly every major region of the world, it was accompanied by a substantial 
decrease in trade growth.  The above data and subsequent graphs shows clearly 
and paraphrase the fact that ports are very vital points along the logistics chain and 
are indispensable for world trade and economy thus they have to be synchronised 
with these two developments.  
 
Ports are the points where all the major technological revolutions in the maritime 
sector started or were influenced and are likely the place where future innovations 
will take place.  For example, it is where Malcolm Mc Clean containerisation concept 
started on the 26th April 1956, when a converted tanker was loaded with 58 
modified, 35-foot truck containers and sailed from Newark to Houston.   
 
Many scholars have placed immense importance in ports.  When Professor Gary 
Crook of UNCTAD was asked for a suitable title for professor Alderton’s book “Port 
Management and Operations”, he suggested “ports: the misunderstood key to 
prosperity” (Alderton, 1999, p. V).  In his key note address at the IAPH’s world port 
conference in Kuala Lumpur in May 1999, Dr. Mahathir, the then Prime minister of 
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 Malaysia clearly contended that, no matter how information technology advances, 
world trade cannot be materialised without ports. This is why every country needs to 
develop much more advanced and efficient ports for its prosperity (Ports and 
Harbours, 2000, p. 3).  
 
Ports usually have a governing body referred to as the Port Authority, Port 
Management or Port Administration. “Port Authority” is used widely to indicate any of 
these three above terms.  The term "Port Authority" has been defined in various 
ways. A sufficiently broad definition of a Port Authority given in 1977 by the 
Commission of the European Union as; a Port Authority is a state, municipal, public 
or private body, which is largely of port facilities and, in certain circumstances, for 
security. 
 
Port authorities have responsibility over some of the maritime access infrastructure 
such as breakwaters, navigational lights and markers and buoys and all elements 
within the port area. However connections in the land network and other forms of 
marine access are owned and maintained by the government.  If the port authority is 
the stevedore under The Hague rules it has the same duty of care as the ship owner 
to handle the cargo properly and carefully (Scobie, 1976, p. 165). 
 
2.3 Port Infrastructure 
 
Ports have specially-designed equipment to help in the loading and unloading of 
vessels.  Private interests or public bodies may provide cranes and refrigerated 
storage.   
 
There is infrastructure outside the port useful for the port in terms of fluidity and 
hinterland connection; this includes the roads, rail, air and inland waterways.  
Seaport infrastructure can be basically categorised into the following; port area 
which is defined as a complex of berths, docks, and adjacent land where ships and 
cargoes are served, maritime access infrastructure which includes channels and 
approximation zones, sea defence (breakwaters, locks) and signalling (lights and 
buoys), port infrastructure which includes berths, docks and basins, storage areas 
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 and internal connections (roads and others) and land access infrastructure 
consisting of roads and railways and inland navigation channels. 
 
Port infrastructure has traditionally been designed and maintained directly by port 
authorities except for the few fully privatised seaports.  Public funds were used to 
finance the building of new infrastructures.  It was argued that these assets should 
be in the public sector, to avoid the risk of monopolization by private firms. There is, 
however, at present a global trend toward revising this model.  Particularly there is a 
move toward increasing the participation of private capital in the building of 
infrastructure, generally through the use of concessions. 
 
2.4 Port superstructure 
 
Port superstructure is divided between the fixed assets built on the infrastructure 
and mobile and fixed equipments including mobile plants and other types of cargo 
handling equipment that facilitate operations at the shore side.  
 
2.5 Ports economic activities 
 
In this global economy and a shrinking world, ports play an increasingly vital role in 
the nation’s economy.  They help ensure the unfettered and efficient movement of 
goods.  They are the gateway for raw materials that feed the nation’s manufacturing 
sector, supply high-tech electronic components, and fill the shelves of retail stores 
with products that define our lifestyles. 
 
Many ports have become the location for industrial clusters.  Several notable port 
centred industrial clusters have developed over the last 50 years including those in 
Rotterdam, Yokohama, Marseilles and Houston. 
 
Ports directly or indirectly provide jobs.  More of port city’s jobs are linked to ports.   
Port activities as well as services have been changing with time as the practice of 
doing trade changes. Containerisation, which led to emergence of door-to-door 
logistics, is by far one of the biggest influences of the radical changes ports has had. 
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 More than 60 % of world general cargo trade moved by sea is carried in containers.  
This is a remarkable market penetration for a technology that dates only from the 
mid-1950s.  Since then there has been a continual increase in both number and 
average size of containerships. These many and mega ships expect efficient and 
effective services from the ports. 
 
In general, modern ports offer two kinds of services: core and value added services 
(World Bank, 2001, p. 9). 
 
2.5.1 Core services 
 
The core services include but may not be limited to the following: marine services 
which are services like access and protection, pilotage, towage, vessel traffic 
management, fire protection service and ship chandler: terminal services which are 
such services like vessel tie-up services, container handling and transfers, container 
stuffing and stripping and cargo storage. 
 
Ports offer repair services in dredging and maintaining channels and basins, lift 
equipment repair, dry dock ship repairs and container and chassis repairs.  Others 
are estate management services and information management services.  A number 
of these services can be outsourced to specialized private sector service providers. 
 
2.5.1 Value added services 
 
Additionally ports are delivering non-traditional services to their customers.  These 
non-traditional services typically expand the role of port service providers in the 
supply chains of shippers.  These services allow ports to participate in specialized 
port service niches and to differentiate themselves from competing ports by means 
other than price and turnaround times.  They include services like reaffixing the 
seats and installing automated dim light on ignition of imported cars done at the port 
of Malmo in Sweden. Improving logistics in ports is now a widely accepted means to 
improve their competitiveness.  
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 Having looked at the elements that defines a port and the activities within it, the next 
section will highlight how private participation in ports entails, basing the argument 
above on the discussion on services offered by ports and with reference to which 
assets are involved and can feasibly be privatised.  This is important because the 
mode of operation of a port will greatly determine the type and quality of services 
offered and thus the need to privatise.  
 
2.6 Port assets and functions 
 
Port privatization is emerging as an international trend, with a number of countries 
moving ahead with plans to privatize ports despite protests in some instances by 
unionized port workers.  This section looks at the assets and functions of a port that 
can be feasibly privatised because though there are many assets and departments 
within a port that can be privatised, not all are feasible.  
 
There are three essential elements of a port, which can be privatized either 
individually or collectively: port land, port operations, and port regulations.  The 
extent of privatization within ports can differ depending on which of these elements 
are transferred from public to the private sector.   
 
2.6.1 Regulatory Function 
 
The port as a regulator element, combines a mixture of duties and responsibilities, 
most of which will have been established by the law of the country.  This regulatory 
role is somewhat appropriately reflected in the port authority function.  
  
Typically a port's regulatory duties and responsibilities include the following; 
Maintaining the conservancy function, ensuring navigable approaches to the port 
are well maintained and improved where necessary and that conservancy fees are 
collected from port users: enforcement of applicable laws and regulations 
particularly on matters relating to health and safety and which may also include 
control of pollution within the port estate.   
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 Also important is safeguarding port users' interests against the risk of monopoly 
formation, and the controlling of natural monopolies.  The regulatory element of the 
port is rarely privatised because of the aforementioned attributes. 
 
2.6.2 Land owner  
 
Land is another element, which can be privatised in a port.  It is a very important 
asset because it is where all the other assets rest.  Ports are very often the largest 
landowners within a city apart from municipalities.  Port estates can be very 
significant indeed, as in Antwerp where the port authority controls some 125km of 
berth length and occupies a land area in excess of 14,000 hectares. 
 
The key tasks a port landowner will need to undertake include; managing and 
developing the port estate, implementing port policies and development strategies, 
supervising major civil engineering works, providing and maintaining channels, 
fairways and breakwaters, providing and maintaining locks, turning basins, berths, 
piers and wharves and, providing road access to the port complex.  In view of the 
strategic significance of port land, it is rarely privatised because of its intrinsic value 
and scarcity.  
 
2.6.3 Operations 
 
Operations refer to the physical transfer of goods and passengers between sea and 
land.  Traditionally this has meant stevedoring services but ongoing shipping 
industry changes have led to the intrusion into this area of the business by specialist 
terminal operators, and a number of shipping lines, especially in the container and 
ferry industries, who now attend to their own landside operations.  
 
Operations may also include a range of added value activities within the port estate, 
such as warehousing, storage and packaging.  This element, as will be seen later is 
the mostly targeted area for privatization.  This is because it is in this part of the 
transport chain where bottlenecks are and has triggered enormous concessions.  
This is one of the main causes why the trend in privatization is steady. 
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 Having looked at the elements in a port that can be privatised the question is to what 
extent? The next section will look upon the extent to which the elements discussed 
above are incorporated in the private sector control giving rise to multifarious models 
on port management as seen next. 
 
2.7 Port administration models 
 
Indeed the popularity of privatization as a scheme towards port reform has inevitably 
altered the governance of ports around the globe.  This notion was supported by 
Mary Brooks (2000) in a research forum in Canada when she contended that the 
recent trend towards devolution in the port industry has spawned considerable 
variety in the types of governance structures now in place around the world.  The 
nature of private sector involvement in port is guided by the adoption of a specific 
management model amongst the different models in place. 
  
Management of ports vary worldwide depending on numerous prevailing factors 
including the socioeconomic structure of the country, the historical developments 
and the types of cargo handled.  The common port administration models are; the 
public service port system, the landlord port system, the tool port system and the 
private port system.  Within these models many options are available as regards the 
specific private participation a port desires. 
 
This section looks at these models in order to offer an overview of the 
characteristics associated with each because it is through the model applied in a 
port that the scope and impact of private sector involvement and participation will 
depend.   
 
2.7.1 Service port model 
 
Here the public port authority provides all services within the port including 
ownership of labour.  The port authority owns the land and all the available fixed and 
mobile assets.  Service ports generally prohibit intra-port competition and are 
monopolistic with negative effects on efficiency and performance.  This type of port 
administration is mainly used in ports in Singapore, India, Israel and some 
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 developing countries.  The notable exception about this port administration model is 
that despite it being touted as the crudest way of port management, the port of 
Singapore using this system through Temasek, the Singaporean government 
investment arm, is the busiest and one of the most efficient ports in the world as 
shown in appendix A. 
 
2.7.2 Tool port model 
 
In this port management model the port authority owns, develops and maintains the 
port infrastructure and superstructure including cargo handling equipment.  The 
equipment operators in this system are port authority employees but other 
operations are performed by private cargo handling firms onboard as well as on 
quay. Examples of tool ports can be found in the United States, the Philippines, 
Australia, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Mexico, Argentina and Chile. 
 
2.7.3 Landlord port Model 
 
It is one of the most common growing forms of port operation and its application is 
on the upward trend.  In this model, the port authority maintains ownership in the 
port while the infrastructure is leased to private operating companies.  The private 
operating companies that lease from the port authority provide and maintain their 
own superstructure, purchase and install their own equipment and provide their own 
dock labour.  In this system the responsibilities of the port authority as a landlord 
include economic exploitation, long-term development of the land and the 
maintenance of basic port infrastructure approaches, basins and berths.   
 
Also the port authority is responsible for the landlord function, such as asset 
management, partnership with private sector, and monitoring of fair competition, 
regulatory function such as navigation control, safety and security, and environment 
protection and facilitation function such as provision of port EDI, inter-port 
cooperation and strategic marketing.  This type of port arrangement model is 
common among European ports.  
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 2.7.4 Private port model 
 
This model, as noted earlier in this study, is the system mainly used in the UK.  
Here, the public sector no longer has any interest in port activities.  Port land is 
owned by the private sector.  The private companies perform all regulatory functions 
and operational activities.  This system has not received much support from port 
administrators mainly because the risk of abuse of the natural monopoly position, 
that ports enjoy, is very high. 
 
After looking at the different forms of port administration in place, the next section 
will give an overview of the situation before privatisation and the post privatisation 
era and how most public port management models failed to meet the expectations 
of port users and governments. 
 
2.8 Pre and post privatisation in ports 
 
This section gives an overview of the chronology of how port privatisation evolved 
overtime with a view to highlight how the privatisation trend started and why it built 
to the status quo.  This will give a suitable and necessary background on how the 
trend in port privatisation has evolved and the rationale behind it.  It will in this case 
show why ports had to shift from the once proven model of total government 
ownership to the otherwise new and consistent trend of private participation in ports 
that is today. 
 
As the saying goes, all great ideas go through three stages: In the first stage, they 
are ridiculed.  In the second stage, they are strongly opposed.  And in the third 
stage, they are considered to be self-evident.  Now, privatization has reached the 
third stage (IAPH, 2001, p. 98). 
 
The port sector has radically changed over the past two centuries.  During the 19th 
century, ports tended to be instruments of state or colonial powers and port access 
and egress were regarded as a means to control markets.  Competition between 
ports was minimal and port-related costs were relatively insignificant in comparison 
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 to the high cost of ocean transport and inland transport.  As a result, there was little 
incentive to improve port efficiency (World Bank, 2001, p. 1). 
 
Private sector investment and involvement in ports emerged as a significant issue in 
the 1980s.  By this time, many ports had become bottlenecks to efficient distribution 
chains of which they are an essential component.  The factors that contributed to the 
gradual systematic breakdown of service quality as illustrated by port congestion 
and consequent chronic service failures include interalia these factors; 
 
Labour unions often refused to accept reductions in the labour force and ignored the 
need to upgrade skills.  Later, however, unions realized that port reform was a 
necessity.  
 
Slow paced centralized government control prevailed not only as a norm in socialist 
economies, but also in many western and developing countries, where national port 
authorities were often promoted by international development banks (World Bank, 
2001, p. 3).   
 
Lengthy bureaucratic procedures and unnecessary state intervention prevented 
management from streamlining operations and reacting quickly to market needs, 
which often delayed the implementation of needed changes.  Decision makers were 
often more responsive to a political or administrative hierarchy than to market 
requirements and thus were interested in non-commercial objectives. 
 
In the 1980s the dismantling of communist systems and the increasing introduction 
of market-oriented policies on a worldwide basis opened the way for decentralized 
port management and for reduced government intervention in port affairs. 
 
Another reason was the inability or unwillingness of many governments to invest in 
expensive port infrastructure or the wrong investment in infrastructure.  During this 
period a number of beautifully constructed port complexes became useless when 
expected demand failed to materialize.  Poor forecasts and inadequate planning and 
strategies contributed to this failure. 
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As a result of these failures in managing port development, governments have learnt 
to rely increasingly on private investors to reduce ports’ reliance on state budgets 
and to spread investment risks through joint undertakings.  Questions therefore 
arose about the appropriate division of responsibilities between the public and 
private sectors.  
 
In some administrations like in Britain, it became increasingly clear that large scale 
government involvement in port operations was counterproductive.  The role of 
government in a market economy, they realised is to focus on monopoly abuse and 
barriers to entry and exit.  
 
The result was that concessions began, and which have had a major impact on 
redrawing traditional boundary lines in ports.  Some port terminals like in Singapore 
have become highly specialized in the cargo handling services they provide and 
manifest fewer of the characteristics of a public service sector raising a potential 
controversial situation of the privatisation trend.   
 
The trend is that ports are being integrated into global logistics chains, and the 
public benefits they provide are taking on regional and global characteristics.  
Private port service providers have become increasingly global in their scope and 
operations.  
 
Recently, a number of acquisitions, mergers and strategic alliances have been 
formed both within the global shipping industry and the port services industry.  An 
example is the acquisition of the P&O Ports chain by Dubai Ports World (DPWorld) 
in March 2006 and the most recent 20% share purchase of Hutchison ports 
conglomerate by the port of Singapore Authority in May 2006.  
 
Because of these global shipping and port service powers, port authorities will have 
difficulties in defending public sector interests which brings us to our next discussion 
on the trend in institutional reforms in today’s ports.  
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 2.9 Institutional reforms and regulations of ports 
 
In the last two decades, a number of countries have undertaken or considered 
institutional reform in the port sub-sector as a means to improve performance and to 
reduce the government's financial and administrative responsibility.  The interface 
between the governments and the ports was too heavy and managers were unable 
to manage the ports commercially.  Technological change has also helped to set the 
stage for reform because of the massive increases in labour productivity and in the 
increased capital requirements of the port.  This has entailed the rethinking of 
national port development strategies, as well as far-reaching reforms in the 
legislative, regulatory, and managerial environment within which commercial ports 
have to operate. 
 
Changes and major trends in the administration in the maritime transport industry 
can be attributed to two major technological changes during the last decade; 
containerization which influenced construction of mega ships and liberalization of 
world economies.  These transformations have led to some new requirements for 
seaports to modernize their infrastructures and to buy new equipment in order to 
continue to be able to provide services to shipping companies. 
 
Containerized shipping has brought profound changes to maritime transport, 
including a shift from labour-intensive to more capital-intensive activities.  Hence 
revising the traditional organization of seaports was vital to prepare ports for a more 
competitive market and less financial dependence on governments. 
 
In his speech during the marking of 50 years in container shipping at the World 
Maritime University on May 31, Mr. Gerald Malia, the representative of former 
Chairman and President of ABS, Dr. Richard T. Soper, Commented that world 
container shipping is growing at between 8% and 10% with China trade last year 
accounting for 37% of the global TEU volumes, a fact that is also accepted by a new 
report released by IBM Business Consulting Services which shows that near-term 
profits in the market for container shipping services are at an all-time high and the 
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 market's growing at 8 to 10% per year.  Forecasts also show that containerisation 
will continue rising (see appendix E). 
 
These developments have precipitated the need for new institutional reforms to 
cope up with the new trends.  Copying the old retrogressive habits and practices 
does not augur well for the new trends and developments operating in a totally new 
and different institutional atmosphere.  Reforms in labour, operational and financial 
fields have been paramount to guarantee success.  Laws regarding working times, 
remuneration and duties and responsibilities needed to be synchronized with the 
new trends in the industry.  
 
Institutional reforms in ports basically involve two steps; identifying the critical basic 
public functions and responsibilities that will define the role of the national and local 
public authorities in charge of the public sector; and secondly, identifying the assets 
needed to support each function and category of services, assessing the adequacy 
of these assets, and determining which among these to tender to private 
operators/investors in to allow contestability.  Ports and governments have been 
adjusting to these realities to sustain port competitiveness through fundamental 
regulatory and institutional reforms.   
 
Supporting this argument, a global survey was conducted by IAPH on its members 
(ports) to determine the extent of institutional reforms and the private sector’s 
involvement in the port industry between 1998 and 1999.  
 
There were 188 participating members, who represented 80% of the total ports 
fraternity.  The vast majority of the 188 respondents indicated that their 
organizations were public corporations established by government.  92% of the 
respondents were public organizations.  71% of which were either a public agency 
or corporation and 21% were department of governments. 7% of the ports were 
private companies, and of these more than two thirds had a government 
shareholding ranging from 60% to 100% (Baird, 2005, p. 125). 
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Figure 3: Global representation of port ownership 
Source: IAPH (1999) 
 
The findings therefore suggest that the influence of private sector actors in ports is 
growing and the trend in institutional reforms is mostly favouring the port as a 
landlord model (partial privatisation) than comprehensive privatisation as shown in 
Figures 3 and 4. Figure 3 also shows that there is a transition from the pure public 
control to more private participation.  
Regarding provision of stevedoring services, the private sector topped the Port 
Authority and public body, though still marginally as shown in figure 4.  Private 
companies operated 36 % of the container terminals while 34% by port authority or 
other public bodies (IAME, 2001, p. 253).   
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Figure 4: Public and private port participation 
Source: IAPH (1999)  
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 The survey further indicated that the involvement of private companies had 
increased especially in port operations within the last two years in 32% of the 
member ports.  It was also expected to further develop in 26% of the ports in the 
next five years. 
 
The main conclusions from the IAPH is that, it is mainly in port development and 
terminal operations that the private sector has significantly expanded their business, 
an area that is experiencing a greater role in private sector involvement.  The role of 
the port authority/public bodies in this regard is still significant especially in many 
developing countries’ ports.  The private sector now has an increasingly major role 
in provision of stevedoring services, although the port authority is also significant in 
this aspect as seen on Figure 4.   
 
It should however be noted that, whilst the IAPH survey states that more ports are 
considering some form of privatisation over the medium term, this is expected to 
relate to private sector provision of port assets and port services, rather than outright 
transfer of port property rights as in the UK.  This brings us to another question, 
what is the trend in port privatisation and concessions as actually seen in the 
contemporary maritime events? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3 PORT PRIVATISATION AND CONCESSIONS IN THE WORLD   
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades, it can be inferred that the maritime sector has been 
characterized by three major trends: globalization, containerization and port 
privatization.  
 
The prevailing process of change in international transport management from a 
segmented modal approach towards a much more integrated transport concept 
tailored to better meet the pressing needs of customer industries is resulting in an 
increasing pressure on seaports to adapt their role and function to this more 
demanding operational environment.  In particular, there has been a need to define 
new partnerships between the public and private sectors in port operations, 
investment financing and asset management leading to a review of the respective 
roles of public and private actors. 
  
Port authorities are now having a major role to play in fostering the development of 
an effective cooperation between interested public and private players, which will be 
required to make it possible to achieve the expected benefits of integrated transport 
and logistic operations. 
 
This chapter gives light on what privatisation is and is not, why there is a 
privatisation revolution, where it is prevalent or whether it is a global phenomenon 
and which sector is mostly affected.  Trends in privatisation will be analysed with 
specific examples.  This in effect will highlight and give evidence as to the visible 
trends that are seen today with regards to the privatisation phenomenon.  To start 
with, what is privatisation?  
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 3.2 The privatisation concept 
 
Privatisation is a term used to cover several distinct, and possibly alternative, means 
of changing the relationship between the public and the private sector.  Defining port 
privatisation is seldom easy and requires careful analysis.  This is normally because 
the extent of private sector involvement within ports varies. 
  
There are as many views on privatization as there are port assets that can be 
privatised.  According to UNCTAD, privatization is the transfer of ownership of 
assets from public to the private sector or the application of private capital to fund 
investments in port facilities, equipment and systems (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 1). 
 
Privatisation can be either comprehensive or partial.  The latter takes the form of a 
public-private partnership and is usually combined with the introduction of a landlord 
port authority.  Comprehensive privatization remains an exception and is not a 
preferred option for major ports as earlier said. 
 
Privatisation takes different variations, which include divesture, deregulation, and 
private ownership of operational assets with market based contractual 
arrangements.  In developing countries, privatisation processes through 
concessions and management contract have been the most popular.  
 
Privatization takes place only when there is a sale of public property to private 
individuals.  It is therefore important to note that the increased participation by the 
private sector in the delivery of port services, without private investment, is not 
privatization but devolution.  
 
In that respect, only the New Zealand and the UK, following its 1991 ports Act, 
actually privatized ports.  In most if not all other countries, most so called 
privatization schemes were the development of private intervention in ports, 
something quite different from privatization, and which had been in existence for 
some time. 
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 Privatization is as much a political process as an economic one and thus strong 
government commitment is an indispensable condition.  In all successful 
experiences, whether in the UK or New Zealand, governments have had decisive 
roles, (UNCTAD, 1995, p. 18). 
 
3.3 Objectives of privatisation and concessions 
 
The most common aim behind a port seeking to bring in the private sector is to 
increase efficiency, consequently to lower port costs, expanding trade as a specific 
aim of privatisation and reducing the cost of investment to the public sector.  Other 
reasons may be to obtain management know how and increasing the speed of 
developing new terminals, complying with ports and harbour legislation, developing 
a public-private partnership, and increasing port revenues.  
 
3.3.1 Why is there port privatization explosion? 
 
Hardly more than an academic concept two decades ago, privatisation has emerged 
within the past few years as one of the most significant challenges to public ports.  
In many countries port development and management were under the direction of 
public administrations with limited appreciation of changing market conditions and 
as a result, port performance was often not demand responsive.  Pervasive 
inefficiencies in national ports in contrast to striking performance records of privately 
run terminals have gradually induced governments in some developing countries to 
reconsider the organization and management of their national port systems. 
 
Providing further impetus to the so called “global stevedores” (Peters, 2000, p. 11) is 
the globalisation of production and the relentless pursuit of economies of scale 
within the container shipping industry, which as earlier indicated led to mega ships 
which in turn need larger scale port facilities that require private sector finance and 
management expertise.  Global stevedores (Table 2) are increasingly meeting these 
requirements as the public sector continues to withdraw from cost-benefit style port 
financing and frontline cargo handling operations. 
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 Table 2: Examples of Global Stevedores 
Pure Private Stevedoring Companies Major Ocean carrier terminal investors 
HPH APMT 
PSA MSC 
Dowered CMA- CGM 
Source: Fairplay, 2006 
 
However, a decision to privatise ports can be driven by a variety of forces.  The 
most common obvious is to relieve a financially strapped government by turning to 
the private sector for an infusion of capital required to modernise and sustain port 
operations, or to bolster the national treasury (Cass, 1996, p. 18).  Government 
controlled ports resort to privatization as a means to seek economic benefits from 
improvement of operational efficiency by cutting labour costs, eliminating the public 
monopoly and reducing port labour force.  This is the rationale that is driving public 
enterprise ports to be tempted into inviting private sector participation. 
 
A study conducted by the World Bank in 1999 showed that the dominant motive of 
port reforms and privatization is the cost saving advantage achieved through 
efficiency provided by the private management as shown in figure 5. 
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Figure 5: Reasons for Privatization Activity (1993-1998)
Source: Private Practices: a review of privatisation in state governments (1999) 
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 Figure 5 clearly shows that the positive trend in port reforms is mainly done with the 
objective and reasons to cut cost from the public coffers. 
 
However, the UK government, one of the pioneers of comprehensive privatization 
models had five major reasons for transferring state-owned port assets to the private 
sector.  These were: to improve the management of the ports; improve efficiency; 
raise revenue for the government; encourage employee share ownership as this 
would help to further motivate port management and employees and; reduce the 
power of trade unions (IAPH, 2001, p. 98). 
 
3.3.2 Impetus behind full port privatization in the UK: A Case study. 
 
The UK is the only example of a country having lengthy experience with 
comprehensive port privatization though a number of ports still operate in the public 
domain.  
 
As mentioned in the previous section, British port structures have evolved in order to 
respond to the needs of modernizing institutions and installations, many of which 
dated back to the early years of the industrial revolution and also to make them 
more responsive to the needs of users.  It is argued that, the Ports Act 1991, which 
started the full privatization process, could be successful only after the abolition of 
the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989.  This Scheme had given port workers a 
virtual guarantee of lifetime employment, contributing heavily to inefficiency and 
subsequent poor financial performance in the port sector. 
 
The composition of the boards in the trust ports in the UK was also a problem since 
they were mainly composed of port users who opposed any move that was against 
their interests.  Tariff increases that were authorized tended to be offset by 
increasing labour costs, which increased steadily as a result of pressure from 
organized labour, supported by the National Dock Labour Scheme (World Bank, 
2001, p. 67).  
 
Actually privatization in the UK began before the ports Act 1991 when the Thatcher 
Administration privatized the British Transport Docks Board (BTDB) under the 
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 Transport Act 1981. Subsequently, the Associated British Ports (ABP) was 
established, floating 49% of its shares in 1983.  As a result of the perceived 
uncertainties associated with this process, only a few ports opted to pursue this 
course.  ABP now operates 21 of the UK's 51 major ports.  It handles nearly a 
quarter of Britain's seaborne cargo.  This case gives an overview of the privatisation 
process in the UK and which acts as a benchmark for administrations trying to 
embrace comprehensive privatisation and why many governments have rejected the 
model. 
 
3.4 Impact of dock labour in privatisation 
 
Port labour with their strong dockworkers union has been a handicap in most 
privatisation processes as mentioned in the UK case.  For example Spain’s biggest 
dockers’ union, the Coordinadora Union, called a five day strike across Spain from 
May 22 to 26, 2006 to object the manning changes proposed under a port bill to be 
voted on by the parliament.  It represents more than one fifth of all the Spanish 
stevedores and the stakes are definitely high.   
 
Other countries also had to adopt labour reforms for their privatisation processes to 
succeed.  For example in New Zealand, in 1989, the employment minister 
introduced the waterfront industry bill.  This was to normalise the employment 
conditions of dockworkers.  In France in 1987, the Government commissioned a 
report, which called for the total deregulation of ports and an end to special dock 
labour laws.  Dock labour reforms were therefore introduced in 1991/92 (Jangana, 
2001, pp. 17-174). 
 
Is there homogeneity in the trends in privatisation?  This is yet another question that 
pops up that seeks to define the uniqueness of environments and therefore no 
universal solution. 
 
After discussing why there is such an upsurge towards port privatisation the next 
section looks at the global trends in port privatisation seen to date.  However in 
tackling this question it should be noted that privatization is an umbrella term 
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 covering multifarious port reform models including concessions, lease contracts, and 
commercialization. A distinction between the different forms of privatization 
mentioned above arises through the scale and scope of private sector 
engagements, that is, the level between partial privatisation, encompassing 
concessions, and comprehensive privatization. 
 
3.5 Global trends in concession and privatisation in ports 
 
Participation of the private sector in the port industry proceeded at a pace adapted 
to the economic and social situation of given countries.  It should be recalled from 
the previous discussion that privatization takes many forms from comprehensive 
privatisation, as is the case with the UK, to partial privatization in the form of leases 
and concessions.  The trends in privatisation also differ regionally and globally. To 
discuss the trends the concept has taken, an analysis is done covering the regions 
and jurisdictions where the concept is marginal and those where it is prevalent thus 
answering the question “where”. 
 
3.5.1  Privatization trends by region 
 
From 1990 to 2000, about 50% of privatization activity took place in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.  About 25% of the activities took place in East Asia and the 
Pacific.  The Asian financial crisis slowed Asian privatization substantially.  
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Figure 6: Privatization revenues in developing countries, by region, 1990-99 ($US b) 
Source: Global Development Finance, the World Bank (1998) 
 
As seen from Figure 6, Latin America and the Caribbean have been leading in the 
privatisation trend but Asia, Europe and Africa are coming up and emulating the 
ideology.  This shows that it is emerging as a global trend that will enter every region 
of the world in the near future.  It is however worth noting that it is not a blanket 
application of the concept since some sectors are more involved than others, as will 
be seen in the next section. 
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 3.5.2 Privatisation trends by Sector 
 
Figure 7: Privatization revenues in developing countries, by sector, 1990-99 ($US b) 
Source: Global development finance, and the World Bank (1998) 
 
As seen from Figure 7 the infrastructure sector has been the major contributor in 
terms of proceeds from privatization.  Though in 1999, primary sector privatization 
overtook infrastructure privatization, the trend continues especially in ports.  
 
In response to the concentration trend that is unfolding in container shipping, a 
number of terminal operators have opted for scale increases.  This is because 
pursuing organic growth alone, container terminal operators realised is a lowest risk 
lowest rewards strategy.  This trend as argued before is facilitated by the 
liberalisation of the port industry.   
 
3.6 Analysis of trend in concessions in ports 
 
Investments in ports and terminal-operating companies have never been as great as 
it is now.  As one reporter, Neil Dekker in the Containerisation International Journal 
of February, 2006 puts it, ports have suddenly become “sexy” (Dekker, 2006, p. 60). 
This brings us to the question: What role are global terminal operators and major 
ocean carriers playing in port privatisation?  
33  
 This section in tackling this question, details the contemporary situation in the port 
sector as regards the trends in privatisation by giving current situation and projection 
taking cognisance the pledges and forecasts made by port authorities. 
 
3.6.1 Global private terminal operators 
 
Encouraged by the ongoing wave of privatisation of port facilities especially in 
container operation, global terminal operators have resorted to the pursuit of higher 
risk growth strategies and have progressed from being single location players into 
the global market, for example HPH and Maersk line amongst others.  
 
A number of global port operators reported network expansion due to 
encouragement from the increasing port administrations opting to involve private 
participation in their port operations.  Some more recent development and trends 
are cited below in the port sector between 2004 up to today which bolsters the 
notion that the trend is positive and is not seemingly going to slowdown. 
 
The Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) started by building a stronghold at its home 
base in Singapore.  Buoyed by the performance and profits it is establishing itself as 
an international benchmark and has started investing outside internationally.  
Recently in May 2006, PSA bought a 20% share in HPH for $4.388 billion further 
widening its international operation.  
 
According to Fock Siew Wah, the Chairman of PSA, PSA is making long term 
investment in the maritime sector.  The strategy is to expand globally and reach all 
possible markets to widen the customer base (Marle, 2006, p. 7).   
 
International Container Terminal Services Inc (ICTSI) from the Philippines has 
completed an $80 million development of Gdynia, Poland and secured a lease to 
operate terminals 9 and 10 of the trans-shipment hub of Naha in Okinawa, Japan 
together with six Japanese stevedoring companies.  Guam Container Terminal in 
the US territory is beginning negotiations with ICTSI to privatise its container 
facilities.   
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 In mid 2004, the Russian government discussed the disposal of 20% of the public 
ownership for the ports of Novorossiysk, St. Petersburg, Murmansk and Tuapse.  It 
was thought that it would relieve the burden of the public sector and improve 
efficiency in the public enterprises. 
 
In Belgium, in April, 2004, P&O Ports (now DPWorld), which held 67.5% of the 
shares of Antwerp Gateway, added 3.5 million TEUs of capacity to its operations in 
this port by signing a 40-year concession for the east side of Deurganckdok. 
 
More recently between 2005 and 2006 the following concessions and leasehold 
contracts took place, while some are even at the planning stages for the future, 
further confirming the continuity in the trend. 
 
In Spain, Hutchison port holdings, (HPH) in May this year (2006), won a 30 year 
concession to build and operate Barcelona’s 93 hectare Prat Container Terminal.  
This concession according to the Managing Director of Hutchison Mr. John Meredith 
will be an investment of $854 million (€ 660m) and will bring to the port of Prat an 
annual traffic of over 4 million TEUs per year.  Projections from this deal are 
estimated that 33 million TEUs will be brought between 2008 and 2022.  Apart from 
this deal Hutchison also has gained central government approval for its bid for a 
33% stake in Huizhou port Affairs Group, a state owned port business operator in 
southern China’s Huizhou City, in Guangdong province (Maritime Asia, 2006, p. 5).  
 
It should also be recalled that HPH has concession holdings in Northern Europe in 
Rotterdam and also the UK in Felixstowe and Thames port.  This is not the end of 
the story since Hutchison has future ambitions in Turkey and Egypt.  
 
Many private terminal operators are trying to penetrate the Asian market since it is 
the biggest player especially China, with booming container trade and with most of 
the largest and most efficient ports in the world.  In May Lloyd’s list published its top 
container 20 ports and 13 of the world’s top 20 ports were in Asia with the top six 
being Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Pusan and Kaohsiung in that 
order (Maritime Asia, 2006, p. 2). 
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 Another player which is fast coming into the scene is the Dubai based DPWorld. 
The Government of Pakistan for example opened its doors for concession bids from 
DPWorld that recently in February this year overpowered PSA to purchase the P&O 
ports conglomerate at $7.3 Billion.  According to UAE Premier Sheikh Mohammed 
Bin Rashid Al Maktoum and Pakistani Prime minister Shaukat Aziz, DPWorld is 
investing $10 billion in ports related projects, two in Karachi and Gwadar.  By virtue 
of purchasing P&O terminals, DPWorld is also in charge of port Qasim initially 
operated by P&O.  
 
The main interest however of DPWorld is the newly constructed deep-sea port at 
Gwadar, Pakistani’s deepest port, which was funded through collaboration with 
China.  It is expected to commence work by the middle of this year (2006).  
DPWorld has already been awarded a 30-year concession to manage the container 
terminal by the Pakistani Government.  Interestingly, DPWorld was not bidding 
alone, there were other very serious bidders like HPH, PSA International, Globe 
Marine services of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan International Container Terminal. 
 
In South Korea, the government awarded DPWorld a concession in conjunction with 
Samsung Corporation where it has invested in a new Pusan container terminal.  In 
January 2006 the terminal was opened by the South Korean president, Roh Moo 
Hyun to a burst of fireworks (Marle, 2006, p. 38).  This investment is seen as an 
answer to the Chinese big investment of the Yangshan container terminal.  
 
It is also interesting to note that the Yangshan deepwater project has also been 
given to a private participator.  The Shanghai municipal government in December 
2005 selected a five strong consortium headed by HPH and APMT to build and 
develop the second phase of this project estimated to cost $850 million and 
scheduled to be completed by December 2006.  In this consortium, HPH and APMT 
will both take 32% stakes, while the Shanghai International Port (Group) Co. Ltd. 
16%, COSCO Pacific were awarded 10% and China Group 10% of the remaining 
shares (Kuai, 2006, p. 87).   
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 In Yemen, June 2005, the government awarded DPWorld a 30-year contract to 
develop and manage the Aden and Ma’lla container terminals at Aden. This is in 
addition to another concession in May 2005 where it had taken over the 
management of UAE’s ports, Mina Zayed and Fujaira (Stephannie, 2006, pp. 58-
59). 
 
According to Marcus Hand in Singapore, July 4 2006 in the Lloyd’s list, ICTSI is 
vying with DPWorld for a new US$200m container terminal in Surabaya, as well as 
issuing bonds to cover expansion in Manila.  They are interested in constructing 
Teluk Lamong, says the Indonesian Minister for Transport Mr. Hatta Radjasa.  
According to press reports in Indonesia, the two companies have bid to build Teluk 
Lamong port, part of the expansion of Tanjung Perak in the eastern industrial city of 
Surabaya.  The US$200m first phase would have a capacity of 1.3m TEUs.  It 
should be remembered that, DPWorld runs the existing container terminal at 
Tanjung Perak, part of its acquisition of P&O ports. 
 
The government of Brazil is increasingly involving private participants to the already 
big presence of global terminal operators like APM Terminals at Teconvi container 
terminal.  For example a niche operator, the portonove Terminais portuarios de 
Naveganteshas has been granted a 25-year concession, with an option for a 25-
year extension, for the portonave project of constructing a new container terminal on 
a Greenfield at Navegantes.  Portonove Terminais portuarios de Naveganteshas is 
to build a 900 meters long quay, 12 meters depth-30,000 TEU capacity terminals 
and is scheduled to open in August 2007 (Fossey, July, 2006).  
 
The trend is such that the profit accruing from the business is luring more and more 
private investors both from the shipping and stevedoring companies. It is forecasted 
that if the trend continues like this by the year 2008 the first four top private 
operators will control over one third of the total container port capacity.  
 
This clearly shows how much governments are considering private participation in 
the port sector all over the world and a confirmation of how the trends in 
concessions are climbing. 
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 3.6.2 Major Ocean Carriers 
 
As noted earlier on the trends in concessions governments and public run ports are 
inviting concession bids not only from private port operators but also vertically from 
shipping lines.  Maersk line for example is already in Rotterdam delta terminal, 
Algeciras in Spain, Salalah Oman, US East, West and Gulf coasts, and Washington 
to name but a few. However, recently other players in shipping are joining the 
lucrative race.  
 
In Germany, June 2004, MSC, one of the few large container carriers with few 
interests in container terminals, set up a joint venture with Eurogate called MSC 
Gate Bremerhaven to operate a dedicated terminal in this port.  A similar previous 
deal involving Maersk highlighted this port’s strategy of having dedicated terminals 
(UNCTAD; 2005, p. 80).  According to Emmanuel Schiffer, Chairman of the group 
management board at Eurogate, a joint venture between Eurogate and APM 
Terminals is set to take off for the new Eurogate Container Terminal at 
Wilhelmshaven expected to commence in 2010, whereby Eurogate will have 70% 
and APM 30%.  
 
In Cameroon, July 2005, APM Terminals, Maersk’s subsidiary, reported adding new 
terminals to its portfolio for example, in Douala after winning a 15-year concession. 
In Nigeria, it has recently been confirmed that APM terminals has won a tender to 
run the Lagos container terminal in Nigeria (Robinson, 2006, p. 10). 
 
In India, Maersk was awarded a 30-year lease jointly with Container Corporation of 
India for the third terminal of Jawarharlal Nehru Port.  In Italy, Maersk has emerged 
as the sole shipping industry bidder on a project to build and operate a major new 
container facility at the port of Savona.  Maersk is part of a consortium that includes 
engineering and construction companies Grandi Lavori Fincosit and Technital.  
Those reported to have shown strong interest ranged from DPWorld to Contship to 
Hutchison.  The new facility will take capacity to 1million TEUs per year, Savona 
port president Cristoforo Canavaro said. 
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 In France, the Le Havre Port authority granted 36-years concession to Maersk’s 
subsidiary, the APM Terminals, along with the Perigault group to develop the 
second container terminal in Le Havre’s port 2000 basin.  A two berth common user 
facility with a quay line of 700 meters with a draught of 16 meters and an annual 
capacity of 630, 000 TEUs is scheduled to commence operation in 2007 (Hooper, 
2006, p. 13). 
 
The French owned CMA-CGM; the third largest liner shipping is also getting more 
into the Container business.  According to the Senior Vice president container 
logistics, Jean-Francois Mahe during a conference on TOC in May, 2006 in 
Hamburg,  the company is looking to establish an extensive global network within a 
couple of years in order to secure  competitive operations.  The company is 
investing in the Chinese Container terminal sector through investment in the ports of 
Tianjin and Shanghai. 
 
In the US, CMA-CGM has signed a 10-year, $120 million contract with Virginia 
International Terminals (VIT), the Virginia port authority’s executive director Mr. 
Robert Bray has disclosed to Containerisation international. CMA-CGM has 
guaranteed an annual throughput of 100,000 TEUs (Fossey, July, 2006).  The group 
also holds 10% to 100% shares through its subsidiary terminal link across Europe, 
Africa and America. 
 
The above show how the trend in privatisation and concessions is headed even for 
further upward heights because lucrative port business coupled with inefficiencies in 
ports are driving governments and private terminal operators to tie the two.  The 
realization of the concept of privatization requires the reliance of various modes of 
privatization.  Chapter 4 deals with this subject. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 PORT PRIVATISATION: MODES AND METHODS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 discussed the world trends in port privatisation from a historical 
perspective and through the status quo as it is today and showed that there are all 
the signs that the positive trend is poised to continue.  In order to attain the goal of 
port privatization there are various methods or forms through which this concept is 
applied because no one port is similar to another.  
 
4.2 Methods of port privatisation  
 
There are multifarious forms of privatization (see Table 3), depending on port size, 
objectives of privatization and initial conditions ranging from leasehold contracts, 
Licences and Concessions, Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT), Build-Own-Operate 
(BOO) and Build-Own-Operate and Transfer (BOOT) arrangements (UNCTAD, 
1998, p. 2).  Others are service contracts, operation and maintenance contracts 
(IAPH, 2001, p. 100).  
 
The most prominent and common amongst these models is contracting out which 
involves the awards of concession and lease contracts.  These are forms of partial 
privatization whereby only part of the assets and activities of a public port body are 
transferred to the private sector.  It is different from comprehensive privatization 
whereby a successor company becomes the owner of all land and water areas as 
well as of all assets within a port’s domain (UNCTAD, 1998, p. 2). 
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 Table 3: Spectrum of port reform tools 
 
Public Management and operations 
   Outsourcing 
      Management contracts 
         Lease and rent contacts 
            Full concession including BOT/BOOT etc 
               Build, Own, Operate (BOO) 
                     Divesture by sale 
Source: World Bank port reform toolkit Module 3 (2001) 
 
A study carried out by the World Bank revealed that the most popular forms of 
private participation in majority of public sector enterprises including ports are 
contracting out in the forms of concessions and lease contracts as shown in Table 3.  
It is such a popular strategy that it has become synonymous with any port 
privatization.  Whenever a port reform project is underway the great majority of 
administrators will have concessions and lease contracts on their table as favourite 
alternatives.  Figure 8 shows how a survey conducted in the US confirms this fact. 
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Figure 8: Popular Modes of port privatization 
Source: Private practices: a review of privatization in state governments, 1998 (USA) 
 
Figure 8 clearly shows how leasing and concessions are preferred more than any 
other methods of privatisation.  
 
There are two main forms of contracts used in ports today: A concession contract 
and a lease contract.  A description of the various forms of privatisation is given to 
highlight their attributes and explains why the trend is that these particular models 
are widely applied. 
 
4.2.1 Concession contracts 
 
Concessions are a centuries old system of operation of public utilities, inherited from 
Roman law (Cass, 1996, p. 44).  Belgium, France the Netherlands and Spain are 
countries where concession of port facilities, on public land, under public control, 
has been the rule for many decades.  
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 In concession contracts, the operator covers investment costs and assumes all 
commercial risks.  Such contracts are often combined with specific financing 
schemes such as Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT). 
 
According to the world bank, a port concession is a contract in which a government 
transfers operating rights to private enterprise, which then engages in an activity 
contingent on government approval and subject to the terms of the contract (World 
Bank, 2001, p. 52).  A concession gives the private partner responsibility not only for 
the operation and maintenance of a utility's assets but also for investments.  Asset 
ownership remains with the government, however, and full use rights to all the 
assets, including those created by the private partner, revert to the government 
when the contract ends, usually in about 30 years. 
 
Concessions are often bid by price: the bidder that proposes to operate the utility 
and meet the investment targets for the lowest tariff wins the concession.  They are 
governed by a contract that sets out conditions assigning the government two 
primary tasks: to ensure that the utility assets which the government continues to 
own are used well and returned in good condition at the end of the concession and, 
secondly through regulation, to protect consumers from monopolistic pricing and 
poor quality of service. 
 
These characteristics distinguish concessions from management contracts on one 
end of the reform spectrum and comprehensive port privatization on the other. 
Concessions, by permitting governments to retain ultimate ownership of the port 
land and responsibility for licensing port operations and construction activities, 
permit governments to safeguard public interests.  At the same time, they relieve 
governments of substantial operational risks and financial burdens. This is one of 
the reasons that make this model have the most positive trend amongst the family of 
private participation models. 
 
Globally, concession agreements between port regimes and private companies are 
implemented through different modalities.  The main schemes in use are BOT, BOO 
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 and BOOT.  Concession arguably is the most admired method of private 
participation in public assets as noted above. 
 
4.2.2 Lease contracts 
 
This involves modalities where an operator enters into a long-term lease on the port 
land and usually is responsible for superstructure and equipment.  Lease contracts 
and concession contracts share the following same major characteristics; the 
Government or public port Authority conveys specific rights to a private company, 
have a defined term (10-50years), and directly or implicitly allocate financial and 
operational risks. 
 
In a lease contract a private firm is given a long-term lease to develop (within its own 
funds) and operate an expanded facility.  It covers its investment plus a reasonable 
return over the term of the lease and pays a rental fee. 
 
There are three basic forms of lease in use today: flat rate, "mini-max," and shared 
revenue leases (World Bank, 2001, p. 52). 
 
Flat rate leases give the lessee the right to use a fixed asset for a specific period of 
time in exchange for periodic payments of a fixed amount.  The main advantage of 
this form of lease is that both parties know the lease rent in advance.  The flat rate 
lease also provides to the lessee the greatest incentive to fully use the available 
capacity of the terminal. 
 
In the mini-maxi lease the lessor gives to the lessee the right to use a fixed asset for 
a specific period of time in exchange for a variable lease payment.  There is a 
minimum and a maximum payment depending on the level of activity recorded. 
 
In a shared revenue lease, the lessor gives to the lessee the right to use a fixed 
asset for a fixed period in exchange for a variable amount of money.  As 
distinguished from a mini-max lease, in a shared revenue lease, there is a minimum 
payment regardless of the level of activity, but no maximum payment.  The main 
characteristics of the shared revenue lease are that there is a minimum level of 
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 compensation, there is no established maximum level, the only limit on the 
maximum compensation is the facility’s terminal’s capacity and that the minimum 
compensation may not fully cover the interest and amortization of the lessor (Port 
Authority) for the lease area.  
 
The attributes of the above mentioned modes of privatisation either lures or scares 
port administrators because of their associated advantages and disadvantages. Is 
privatisation, in its different forms, a panacea for the myriad of problems in ports 
today?  The next section discusses this question. 
 
4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Privatization and Concessions 
 
Having looked at the various trends sector-wise and regionally that port privatisation 
takes, the most preferred modes of attaining the privatisation goal, and the reason 
why perhaps the trend seems to incline on concessions and leases, this section will 
in turn seek to highlight the pros and cons of privatisation and how the port 
privatisation forms have faired on internationally with a view to show that despite it 
being on the rise there are no guarantees for success.  However, it should be 
remembered that most of the privatization activities happening today in the ports are 
in the container handling business. 
 
Is privatisation a panacea for the myriad of problems in ports today?  This is one of 
the questions lingering in the minds of many governments and administrations faced 
with port reforms.  Confusion has arisen in the maritime industry because of the 
contradictory perception by maritime experts and pundits.  Cases of successful 
public run ports like the Port of Singapore against the notion that privatisation is the 
answer to inefficient public administration of ports have created a sort of quagmire. 
 
There are numerous success stories where port authorities have transferred to the 
private sector operations previously performed by the public sector through 
concessions.  Cases of success as well as failures are hereby given to show that 
though the process has generally succeeded in many ports, it is not a blanket 
success because the privatisation process proved in some cases a total fiasco.  
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 Different authors and experts have different and divergent views about the 
privatisation concept and the best port administration models.   For example, a 
paper published in the journal, Maritime Policy and Management by Saundry and 
Turnbull in 1997 indicated that the promises of greater competition, greater 
investment and improved commercial efficiency had not occurred in UK ports due to 
privatisation (Alderton, 1999, p. 93).  That is to say privatisation per se cannot 
guarantee success. 
 
Not everybody therefore in the maritime sector has supported this idea as a 
universal panacea.  The perennial objection to privatisation by politicians and 
bureaucrats running public sector businesses is that they can manage as well as the 
private sector.  This is today's version of the fatal conceit of central planning. 
 
Some critics argue that ports are natural public assets and must remain in the public 
domain, as they are important to national security.  In case of a war, the first targets 
are ports. Naturally, such strategically important assets must always be under the 
control of a public authority. 
 
Critics opposed to the trend are like the vice president of Water Transport Workers 
federation of India, Mr. K.V.A. Iyer.  This federation is one of the five major 
federations representing port and dockworkers in the country, and is spearheading 
the agitation against privatisation of ports.  
 
Mr. K. V. A. Iyer, who spoke to Business Line in an interview on, August 29, 2005 
says, “Privatisation does not promote the interests of ports or the country”.  He 
advised the Association against transferring of public assets to private players for 
operating container terminals through BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) route.  Mr Iyer, 
who is also the Working President of the Cochin port Labour Union, strongly 
opposes transferring of ownership or control of ports to multinational companies.  
 
Excerpts from the interview reveal that though he agrees with the findings from the 
IAPH study in 1999, which confirms that the influence of private sector actors in 
ports is growing, he insists that the role of public sector agencies also remains 
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 significant, so ports must remain in the hands of the government and operated as 
public entities because the benefits from privatisation accrue to a very small section 
in society. 
 
Another critic opposed to the trend is Ms Meritiria Turei, an MP of Green Party in 
New Zealand who was quoted in the article “Let failed bid be a sign - port should be 
retained by public” on 13th April 2006 in a press release of the Green party of 
Aotearoa New Zealand. 
 
Ms Meritiria Turei says “Public assets like Lyttelton port must be retained in public 
hands. The returns from such assets, built up through investment of public funds, 
should be directed into the communities who support them.”  She believes that if 
Lyttelton port is sold, even in part, to a private company, money will leak out of the 
community into overseas hands, which is unacceptable.  
 
The interesting observation from some literature is that some public ports notably 
the port of Singapore, a world class government owned port, are doing extremely 
well that privatisation is sometimes seen as no panacea for the current problems 
facing the ports.  
 
However, as Victor Hugo, the great French author once said, “An invasion of armies 
can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."  It is therefore difficult if not 
impossible for the critics to stop the idea of privatisation.  
 
Despite the views from the critics and pundits of the trend, privatization in any of the 
forms mentioned above has the following advantages and disadvantages. 
 
4.3.1 Advantages of privatization and concession: cases of success 
 
Conflicting interest, national esteem, attitudes rooted in traditional values and 
misguided market assessment have been strong counter forces of privatisation, but 
as the effects of fiscal crises and deteriorating trade performances have become 
more pronounced, a growing number of governments have started to adopt 
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 privatisation due to the benefits attached.  This fact is supported by Cass when he 
says privatisation in certain circumstances holds the promise of stimulating 
economic growth particularly for those whose livelihood depends directly on port 
activity and trade (Cass, 1996, p. 5).  
 
The benefits of privatisation and concessions in particular in the port sector include: 
Better and more efficient port operations performed by private operators. Giving 
contracts to experience and world-renowned operators like Hutchison will have a 
managerial input in the departments lacking the efficiency required.  For example 
privatisation of the Jeddah port has remarkably reduced waiting time for container 
ships from 5.6 hours in 1996 to 0.4 hours in 1999 as seen in Table 4 and Figure 9 
(Bakr, 2001, p. 52.) 
 
Table 4: Waiting time at Jeddah port 1996-1999 (Hours) 
 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Waiting 
time(Hrs) 
 
5.6 
 
1.2 
 
0.7 
 
0.4 
Source: Jeddah port (2001) 
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Figure 9: Waiting time at Jeddah port 1996-1999 (Hours) 
Source: Jeddah Port (2001)  
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 Privatisation allows application of private capital to socially and economically 
desirable projects, freeing up government funds for other priority projects and by so 
doing proper allocation of scarce resources is done.  Concessions thus relieve the 
finances of the grantor.  Concessions lead to transfer of risks for construction 
finance and operation of the facility to the private sector by the port authority 
engaging in other less risk departments and where it is needed most, like the 
regulatory function, is another attractive factor for privatisation. 
 
Concessions lead to attraction of foreign investment and technology by the port 
authority.  For example, under BOT the assets will be transferred after the end of the 
contract making the port better off than it was before the contract and acting as an 
indirect investment for the port. 
 
Arising from these advantages, there are cases where privatisation was a great 
success as follows; 
In Argentina, the award of terminal concessions to four competing companies in 
1994 in Buenos Aires brought down handling charges significantly through improved 
labour productivity. 
 
In Panama, between 1995 and 1998, Panama transferred port assets in operations 
to the private sector and the result was an attraction of more than $380 million in 
investments for modernization and expansion.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, the privatisation of the Southern Container Terminal, Jeddah in 
1997 led to enormous improvements in both productivity and equipment fleet.  
Handling just under I million TEUs a year before, it is now one the biggest container 
terminals in the Middle East and among the top 50 worldwide.   The award of the 
tender by the Saudi Government to DPWorld has solved problems of equipment, 
infrastructure and operations related problems.  This led to a productivity gain of 
33.5% in container handling by 1999 (Bakr, 2001, p. 104).  This was an 
achievement to the Saudi economy and their central aim of privatisation, which was 
to increase the number of Saudis working in the ports industry, a policy they called 
“Saudisation”. 
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 In the UK, the abolition of the National Dock Labour Scheme in 1989 and similar 
labour reforms in other countries for example in Italy, France and Spain has paved 
the way for the public sector to withdraw from port operations.  If it were not for 
these port reforms, the UK case would not have been a success either.  
 
In Kenya, there was some partial management transfer of the container terminal in 
Mombasa to a commercial terminal operator, the Hutchison’s Felixstowe port 
consultants, which resulted in a short lived replacement of outdated equipment, 
bureaucratic procedures streamlined and productivity of the terminal improved. 
 
4.3.2 Disadvantages of privatization and concession: cases of failure 
 
As already put forward by those against the trend, Ms Meritiria Turei of New Zealand 
and Mr. K. V. A. Iyer of India, who maintain that privatisation is not the universal 
panacea for the current bottlenecks in ports, there are associated drawbacks that 
inevitably threatens administrators who do not thoughtfully consider the concept. 
 
Baltazar and Brooks (2001) contend that full privatization is not necessary and that 
alternative devolution models can be successful if the appropriate governance 
model is present.  This view is not a radical one.  As Caves and Boardman and 
Vining showed, the private sector does not always outperform the public sector 
(Brooks, 2004, p. 180).  Privatisation in ports is criticised because of the following 
drawbacks; 
 
There is a potential monopolistic tendency associated with privatisation schemes. 
Concessions have shortcomings and have not always been popular with all 
governments because of the dominant position of the concessionaire.  They are 
perceived to have a considerable tendency to transform into an oligarchy of port 
service providers. 
 
In developing countries, there is an unwelcome feeling amongst the populace that 
port privatisation will lead to few private firms taking control of the strategic 
economic units like the ports without due regard to the welfare of the nation.  The 
general argument is that even if privatisation enhances ports efficiency, the bulk of 
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 benefits will accrue to privileged few whereas the costs are borne by the many, 
particularly taxpayers, consumers and workers consequently reducing overall 
welfare. Thus it has negative distribution of wealth, income and political power.  
More disturbing is the fact that with little competition, the profit maximization drive of 
private ports could often result to price discrimination and expensive port services. 
 
There are also complains that concessions lack transparency.  As Cass puts it, the 
concessionaire is often subjected to pressure to employ staff designated by the 
Government or port authority or provides additional free services (Cass, 1996, p. 
45). Therefore concessions have sometimes been breeding grounds for corruption 
and patronage. 
 
Winning bids are sometimes based on unrealistic financial projections, placing the 
sustainability of the concession agreement in jeopardy.  This is caused by some 
desperate investors who lack the vision and forecasts and place unrealistic bids only 
to fail within a short term. 
 
There is danger that a concessionaire will not properly maintain the facilities under 
concession, returning them to the government in bad condition; or the danger that 
the concessionaire and the Port Authority disagree on the operational need for and 
financial feasibility of critical investments.  A recent example involves a case in 
Indonesia where the government is threatening to buy back the 51% of HPH shares 
in Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT) for alleged slow tracking (Rao and 
Mccawley, 2006, p. 12).  HPH is criticised for using JICT as a mere feeder terminal 
for Malaysia and Singapore ports.  
 
Some critics also argue that the private sector is not concerned with externalities, 
which are an important issue for many goods and services the governments provide. 
Externalities are an important factor in infrastructure projects or projects with 
environmental consequences.  As Professor Ma of WMU contends externalities 
require significant consideration in a project’s cost benefit analysis.  The problem is 
that polluters and sufferers are different bodies (Ma, 2005, p. 128). 
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 Further buttressing the arguments against this concept are cases of failure that the 
critics base their support as below analysed to illustrate their ideologies: 
 
According to Professor Meletiou, in a port privatisation conference in Portugal 
(2000), it was estimated that by 1998 there were 100 contracts for port concessions 
(most related to container terminals), for a total estimated private investment amount 
of $6.3 billion.  Geographically, however, imbalances were significant with 42% of 
the projects signed were in Latin America and Caribbean region, 5% in the Middle 
East and North Africa region, 38% in East Asia and Pacific region and 4% in 
Europe, central Asia and other African regions. 
  
However, there have been a number of incidents of privatizations involving ports 
that have not worked out; In Indonesia, the Koja container terminal under private 
management ran into difficulties and the public port company took back the facilities. 
 
The city of Rostock, Germany demanded return of the terminal it contracted to a 
private group for operation, citing lack of compliance with the original contract. 
 
Following a dispute with the port Authority of Trieste, the commercial terminal 
operator (Europe Combined Terminals - ECT) selected to operate the container 
terminal in the port under a 30-year contract withdrew from the contract after 
eighteen months.  And unfortunately, the success story in Mombasa was reversed 
when the commercial terminal operator terminated its contract with the port as a 
result of breakdown of equipment that the government failed to refurbish or replace. 
 
The above discussed are therefore the general pros and cons and cases of failure 
that motivate or militate against the prevailing port reform trend. 
 
In summary, this chapter has discussed the essence of privatisation by tackling 
questions like why it is on the rise, where it is prevalent and how it applied in the 
world over.  This is very important because it defines the modalities and shows the 
bases from which young developing nation can replicate and embrace in order to 
cope with the current wave of port privatisation.  The analysis given in this chapter 
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 also gives a wider spectrum of choice for ports in developing countries to make in 
order to avoid a future failure in an investment in a facility like port which involves a 
lot of fixed costs which are sunk costs. 
 
The following chapter then discusses the port reforms taken by governments in 
Kenya and Tanzania and gives a comparison between the port of Mombasa and Dar 
es Salaam highlighting the advances made in each port with respect to the level of 
privatisation and the trends therein.  This follows the argument from chapters 3 and 
4 on the rationale behind privatisation and looks at a contemporary situation of 
seaport reforms in the two coastal states with sharp contrasts in their levels of 
privatisation and verifies the notion of whether privatisation has proved to be a 
solution for port operations or not.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SEAPORT REFORMS: A Case of Kenya and 
Tanzania Ports 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Seaports systems in developing countries have been increasingly reflecting inter-
port competition on an international basis and trends towards port privatisation. 
Kenya and Tanzania are two neighbouring port states with virtually the same level of 
port facilities but different levels of port reforms.  The level of privatisation in the port 
sector in Tanzania is much advanced compared with its counterpart in Kenya.  
There is a very stiff competition for transhipment and transit traffic between these 
ports emanating from their strategic positions vis-à-vis the landlocked neighbouring 
countries of Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.  This has made these two countries an 
interesting and apt case study. 
 
This chapter tracks the development of private sector initiatives in these respective 
maritime states through a comparative study of their level of port privatisation with a 
view to verify the otherwise universal standpoint of rising port privatisation.  Port 
performance indicators are used to verify and confirm the arguments.  An 
assessment of the present and future projection of the general trend of port 
privatisation in the world is also made. 
 
5.2 Seaport reforms: the case of Kenya 
 
5.2.1 Background of the Port of Mombasa 
 
The port of Mombasa is managed by Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), a statutory body 
under the Ministry of Transport set up by an Act of parliament in 1978.   
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 It is the largest in East Africa and serves, not only Kenya, but also the landlocked 
countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
Southern Sudan.  With an average depth of 11 meters, it handles a variety of 
agricultural products in break bulk, containerized, and bulk form.   It has 13 general 
cargo berths, 3 container berths with four 40-ton ship-to-shore cranes and 72 reefer 
points, and a 30,000-ton bulk grain receiving facility.  Figure 10 shows a landscape 
map of the port.  
 
 
Figure 10: Landscape map of Mombasa Container terminal 
Source: KPA (2005) 
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As part of its modernization campaign, in 2005 KPA acquired new 4 panamax ship 
to shore gantry cranes from China’s ZPMC, 12 new rubber tiered gantry cranes, 2 
rail-mounted gantry cranes and 4 new reach stackers. Currently, there is 
government support to privatize stevedoring and container operations, but the 
process is proceeding slowly.   
 
 
Figure 11: Location of Kenya 
Source: Wikipedia (2006) 
 
The port is the busiest on the East African Coast and a major port of call for 
international shipping lines.  It is strategically located to serve the whole of the great 
lakes region and the horn of Africa.  
 
5.2.2 Kenya’s Privatization Background 
 
In 1991, the President of Kenya appointed a high level policy-making body, the 
Parastatal Reform Programme Committee (PRPC) to supervise and coordinate the 
parastatal reform program.  The Executive Secretariat and Technical Unit (ESTU) 
acted as the secretariat of PRPC. A Department of Government Investments and 
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 Public Enterprises (DGIPE) within the Ministry of Finance to represent the 
Government and to oversee the reform process of public enterprises was also 
established. 
 
The key features of this macroeconomic and structural reform program were a 
reduction in the fiscal deficit and enhanced monetary discipline; liberalization of 
external and internal markets; initiation of parastatal reform based upon 
restructuring of strategic parastatals and divestiture of non-strategic enterprises; 
improved government management through reduction of the size of the civil service 
and reorganizing key ministries.  The World Bank group, particularly the Private 
Sector Advisory Services (PSAS), provided active consultation to the GOK to 
conceptualize and articulate the overall strategy. 
 
Kenya started to implement the Parastatal Reform Project in 1994.  The objective of 
this project, financed by the World Bank, was to support parastatal reform as a 
means of reducing the Government’s role in the economy.  
 
5.2.3 Restructuring Study for the KPA 
 
During the last ten years the port of Mombasa has experienced acute problems in 
managerial and operational fields which have adversely affected the overall port 
performance.  Operational performance declined to such an extent that major 
shipping lines imposed a surcharge on containers shipped to Mombasa.  The 
imposition of this surcharge prompted the government to establish an inter-
ministerial task force that led to increased productivity within the container terminal.  
The surcharge by shipping lines was a means to press for improvements.  Some 
temporary measures were put in place in the form of memorandum of understanding 
(MOUs) between KPA and shipping lines in 1998 to use their own quay transfer and 
yard equipment for operations in return of tariff rebates.  This brought short term 
relief.  Before such temporal measures there were earlier on major restructuring 
steps taken by the government through consultants as follows: 
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 In 1995 the Department of Government Investment and Public Enterprises of the 
Ministry of Finance commissioned a Kenya ports Authority restructuring study. The 
study was conducted by Hickling Corporation of Canada.  The study proposed a 
restructuring plan with emphasis on four broad elements including the following;  
Introduction of new legislation to strengthen accountability of KPA, setting and 
monitoring targets of performance and implementation of restructuring plan through 
a performance contract between KPA and the Government, introducing changes in 
the financial structure of KPA including a reduction in KPA's planned capital 
programme, reduction of KPA's tariffs and payment of regular dividends and lastly 
reintroducing private stevedores, leasing the container terminal to a private operator 
and privatizing selected marine services of KPA. 
 
The study recommended that the government should set and review port objectives 
through a Performance Contract. Since the worldwide trend is towards 
commercialization, the study recommended that the KPA should retain the core 
fixed assets, but private companies should participate in the management of the 
day-to-day operations of some aspects of the port.  In this regard, the port should 
accelerate its transformation into a land-lord port but retain ownership of major port 
assets and either lease facilities or license private sector operations through a 
transparent and competitive bidding process.  
 
If all the recommendations of the study concerning operational activities of the port 
were implemented, the move would confine KPA's role to regulatory issues and to 
the role of landlord, in effect removing KPA from operational activities and functions, 
which will be privatized.  Unfortunately though the Hickling study was conducted 
with a very high degree of professionalism, the recommendations to date are 
unimplemented.  However signs today are that the current government under 
pressure from World Bank looks serious to implement and has embarked on a 
serious reform programme and there is every indication that the government is 
seriously committed to restructuring the port services. 
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 5.2.4 The trend of port reform at the Port of Mombasa 
 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, Mozambique and Kenya had been the only countries to 
award private contracts for port operations. Mozambique awarded lease contracts 
for Maputo coal terminals in 1993 and container terminals in 1996.   Kenya entered 
into a management contract for the container facility with an international operator 
(Hutchison’s Port of Felixstowe Consultants) in 1996 that was later cancelled 
because of lack of control as will be explained later in the study.   
 
The World Bank supported the privatization process in Kenya through the Parastatal 
Reform and Privatisation Technical assistance Credit Programme with respect to the 
reform of the core and more strategic public enterprises.  
 
The government however is pursuing a policy of economic reforms, which includes 
economic liberalisation and divesture from parastatal organization including KPA, 
but it is so slow that there are no any meaningful changes so far seen. 
  
5.2.5 Bottlenecks to port privatisation in Kenya 
 
On a global perspective private participation in the port sector has encountered 
myriads of resistance all over the world ranging from social, political and even 
security bottlenecks.  A notable striking political and security example is the recent 
tussle between DPWorld and the US administration over the P&O US based assets 
after its acquisition of P&O Ports.  Takeover encountered a lot of resistance from 
politicians on a security and political standpoint to the extent that DPWorld has 
decided to handover P&O American operations to a US entity to manage.  
 
The same is now happening in India where Hutchison is facing security clearance 
problems in its bid to enter the India market due to delays from the Indian 
government in granting security clearance for the container terminal projects in 
Mumbai and Chennai.  In the past, HPH has been denied permission to bid for port 
projects in India due to its perceived links with mainland Chinese authorities 
(Nadkarni, 2006, July, 14). 
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 On the Kenyan perspective, the overall impact of the privatizations is rather modest, 
in relation to the potential.  This is because the more ambitious privatization program 
adopted in 1997/98 is still largely at the level of intentions.  
 
The World Bank’s Parastatal Reform Technical assistance Project had supported 
development of a performance contract to bring in new private management.  This 
led to contracting of Hutchison Whampoa group in the Mombasa Port resulting in a 
notable increase in the ports throughput.  However, eventually the managers 
withdrew at the end of their contract because of difficulties in achieving the level of 
day-to-day control from government for management which they felt was necessary 
to implement agreed improvements.   
 
Labour unions also stand as a bottleneck to the port privatisation initiative. KPA 
employs nearly 5000 staff.  So far the corporation is spending about 42% of its 
revenue on wages despite the recent introduction of financial discipline at the port.  
Overstaffing is evident, and a 50% reduction would be realistic. This has hampered 
the process of privatisation due to high labour costs eating into the meagre profits 
achieved.  Both managerial staff and general workers are worried about a looming 
retrenchment programme, which is expected to reduce KPA's bloated workforce to 
3,500 workers. 
 
While performance has improved a little, efficiency at the Port of Mombasa is still 
relatively poor. Delays of containers are substantial; the dwell time for containers 
cleared at the port averages over 18 days for domestic imports and almost 20 days 
for transit containers.  Even containers moved directly to the Inland container depots 
(ICD) remain within the port area for almost eight days. 
 
A key factor underlying the poor productivity is the low availability of cargo handling 
equipment: poor design, limited access to foreign exchange to fund spares, poor 
maintenance management, lengthy and cumbersome procurement procedures, and 
inadequate coordination between the supplies department and the maintenance 
department.  This to a significant extent was responsible for the problems facing the 
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 KPA contract with the port of Felixstowe of the UK, which was intended to improve 
operation efficiency of containerised traffic. 
 
The poor state of the Mombasa-Nairobi highway, the major highway connecting the 
port and its hinterland, has also contributed to the problem as a result of freight 
delays between the port and the hinterland.  
 
Customers are concerned about tampering and theft of goods at the port, 
processing delays, the dilapidated facilities and a controversy over different rates 
charged to companies handling similar commodities.  
 
More significantly, the drop in volume of cargo loaded and unloaded has been 
associated with poor port management.  “Highly politicised selection of managers, 
corruption, and disregard of professional standards and frequent changes of 
management has created weaknesses in KPA's performance," as Otieno Kajwang, 
an opposition Member of Parliament lamented recently. 
 
The vexed subject of privatisation generated a heated debate both in and out of 
Parliament with local leaders demanding that the government shelves the idea as 
this would alienate the local community and cause uncalled for redundancies of 
labour.  Political and religious leaders have also opposed the privatisation saying it 
could fall into the wrong hands and lead to total degradation of the asset. 
 
Privatisation is also thought of being resisted by a cartel of well-connected 
politicians and businessmen whose firms are contracted to the port.  Most of these 
companies perform non-specialised duties that could be done by the corporation's 
workers at no extra cost. 
 
These resistances are impacting negatively in terms of loss of transhipment and 
transit markets to the neighbouring port of Dar es Salaam.  Kenya is paying the 
price for years of neglect to its port and road infrastructure as other ports on the 
eastern seaboard vie to pick up the business it is losing.  Since the Concession of 
container terminal services in Dar-es-Salaam to HPH in 2000, Mr. Samson Luhigo, 
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 the Tanzania Ports Authority Director-General, contends that, delays have been 
reduced and goods are reaching inland markets on schedule.  
 
Kenya's Port of Mombasa is in danger of losing its historical dominance in the region 
to Dar es Salaam.  Landlocked countries have traditionally used Mombasa as their 
port of choice for maritime freight services.  
 
There are currently efforts and measures aimed at involving the private sector by the 
new government.  However, those measures are likely to take time to come to 
fruition and any delays in the face of stiff competition are likely to cost Kenya dearly.  
Kenya needs a sustainable port policy in order to grow and become more efficient, 
but will need to overcome the current inherent political contradictions and confusion.  
To focus on improvement on the already inefficient public port management at the 
cost of prevailing port development of privatisation is short-sighted and politically 
bankrupt. 
 
5.3 Seaport reforms: the case of Tanzania 
 
5.3.1 Background of the Port of Dar es Salaam 
 
The port of Dar es Salaam, located latitude 6.5 and longitude 39.17 east the major 
port in Tanzania managed by Tanzania Port Authority (TPA), [Originally Tanzania 
Harbours Authority, (THA)].  TPA presently owns Dar es Salaam, Tanga and Mtwara 
ports.  
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Figure 12: Location of Tanzania 
Source: Site maps (2006) 
 
TPA is a public corporation established on 15th April 2005 following the repeal of 
THA Act No. 12/77 and enactment of TPA Act No. 17/2004 with the following 
mandate: to establish and coordinate a system of harbours, to provide facilities 
relating to Harbours and provide harbour services; with the approval of the minister, 
to construct and operate new harbours; to construct, operate and maintain beacons 
and other navigational aids, to carry on the business of stevedore, wharfage; to act 
as a warehouseman to store goods, whether or not the goods have been or are to 
be handled as cargo or carried by the authority; to consign goods on behalf of the 
other persons to any place either within or outside the United Republic; With the 
approval of the Minister, to act as carriers of goods or passengers by land or sea, 
and to provide amenities or facilities that the Authority considers necessary or 
desirable for persons making use of the facilities or services.   
 
TPA has a workforce of about 4,000. Its major responsibilities include developing, 
managing and promoting the port sector in Tanzania. The Authority is being 
restructured to be a landlord port authority whilst most of the port operations will be 
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 performed by the private sector.  The programme is scheduled to be completed by 
the end of 2006. 
 
5.3.2 Tanzania’s Privatization Background 
 
Public owned organizations in Tanzania were a direct consequence of the country’s 
policy of socialism and self-reliance, which was adopted in 1967.  This resulted in 
the nationalisation of all privately owned property in order to equally distribute 
wealth. Upon doing this, the government established State Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). It was anticipated that faster economic development was forthcoming but 
did not work.  The country’s economy continued to dwindle. Thus in 1992, the 
parliament passed the Public Corporations Act, and its amendments in 1993 
opening up its doors for private sector participation in the economic development of 
the country. 
 
Further development in this regard was in the establishment of the Presidential 
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) in 1993 under the Public 
Corporations Act (amendments) giving it the following powers; to specify 
corporations for restructuring and execute detailed plans of specified corporations. 
(Kakusa, 1999, p. 31) 
 
5.3.3 Restructuring Study for the Tanzania Ports Authority 
 
In 1994, THA in corroboration with the World Bank concluded a major development 
study for the port of Dar es Salaam.  The study chartered a 10 years plan, which 
focused in improving physical, commercial, operational and financial efficiency of the 
port.  In line with government resolve to transform THA into landlord status and 
giving to private operators all the operation activities of the port, the study 
recommended establishment of business units for concessions to private 
developers. The first candidate for privatisation was the container terminal business 
unit. 
 
In 1996 the Government adopted a milestone decision to include utilities and 
infrastructure ventures in the privatisation agenda.  Privatisation of utilities and other 
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 major transactions was done with the assistance of transaction or investment 
advisors who were normally merchant banks and multinational consultancy firms.  
This led to the commercialization study for Tanzania Ports Authority.  
 
5.3.4 Privatisation strategy for TPA  
 
The objectives in privatising TPA include: improving efficiency of port operations and 
enhancing quality of services offered to customers, to improve the port's 
competitiveness over other regional ports, and to improve profitability of port 
operations. 
  
5.3.5 Privatisation of the Dar es Salaam Container Terminal 
 
According to the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC), the 
Government of Tanzania has successfully completed the privatisation of the 
container terminal.  After following an international competitive tender process, it 
selected the winning bidder as the consortium of International Container Terminal 
Services Inc, ICTSI International Holdings Corporation, both of Manila, Philippines 
and Vertex Financial Services Ltd of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
   
The consortium formed and registered a local company at the end of April 2000 
called Tanzania International Container Terminal Services Ltd (TICTS) with 
International Container Terminal Services Inc. taking 51% of the shareholding, 
ICTSI International Holdings Corporation 24% and Vertex Financial Services 25%.  
The ten year lease contract was signed on 5 May 2000 and responsibility for running 
and operating the Container Terminal was handed over to TICTS on 10 September 
2000.  Subsequently ICTSI sold its shareholding to Hutchison International Port 
Holdings Limited (HPH).  In 2005 the Government extended the period of the lease 
by a further fifteen years. 
 
The privatisation process of the Dar es Salaam container terminal has bore fruit and 
has been envied by many ports in the region.  This is quickly becoming a paradigm 
port in the region. The success seen from the Dar es Salaam example can be 
pegged against the slow pace at which its counterpart, the Mombasa Container 
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 Terminal is dragging.  A comparative study of performance between the Dar es 
Salaam container terminal and the Mombasa Container Terminal is done in the next 
section owing to their competitive situation and their different levels of liberalisation 
with a view to show competitiveness of privately operated container terminals. 
 
5.4 Comparative study: Mombasa against Dar es Salaam container terminals 
 
The container terminal at the port of Mombasa is a 3-berth facility with a quay length 
of 596 meters while that of Dar es Salaam is also a 3-berth facility but with 560 
meters and both use the yard gantry system. The Dar es Salaam container terminal 
as compared to the port of Mombasa registered tremendous improvements from 
2001 in productivity.  According to the Director General of TPA Mr. Samson Luhigo, 
two factors have led to the 50% boost in productivity in recent years. 
 
The first was a project completed in 2000 to deepen, widen and straighten the 
entrance channel and to install navigation aids to allow 24-hour access to the port. 
Average ship turnaround time was slashed as a result.  This led to significant time 
and money savings to forwarders and ship owners. 
  
Secondly, Dar es Salaam container terminal was contracted to the Hutchison port 
Holdings; as a result the port has the highest productivity rate in Eastern and 
Southern Africa with container handling rates reaching 23 moves per crane per hour 
(Luhigo, 2005, p. 18).  This is different to the case of Mombasa as will be revealed 
by the details in various categories of indicators analysed below. 
 
A comparison in terms of transhipment traffic flow is given between the two ports to 
show how this coveted traffic is shifting to the Port of Dar es Salaam due to the 
privatisation programme.  Productivity between the ports is also compared to show 
why shippers and ship owners are getting attracted to the newly privatised container 
terminal of Dar es Salaam.    
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 5.4.1 Transhipment Traffic 
 
There is an apparent loss of transhipment traffic from the port of Mombasa to its 
competitor, Dar es Salaam, as shown in Table 5, 6 and Figure 13.  
 
Table 5: Mombasa container traffic (TEUs) 2001-2005 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
IMPORTS 134,497 143,359 173,39 203,918 
EXPORTS 130,234 134,700 157,209 200,434 
TRANSHIPMENTS 25,769 27,368 49,605 34,245 
TOTAL 290,500 305,427 380,353 438,597 
Source: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics (2005). 
 
 
Table 6: Dar es Salaam container traffic (TEUs) 2001-2004 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 
IMPORTS 68,921 73,090 90,135 105,594 
EXPORTS 66,519 68,927 77,663 93,730 
TRANSHIP 
MENTS 
6,280 12,409 18,319 27,790 
TOTAL 141,720 154,426 186,117 227,114 
Source: THA port Statistical Unit (2005). 
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Figure 13: Mombasa Containerised Cargo (TEUs) From 2001-2004 
Source: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics (2005) 
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Figure 14: Dar es Salaam Containerised Cargo (TEUs) from 1998-2004 
Source: THA port statistical unit (2005) 
 
From Tables 2 and 3, transhipment cargo has slowly been shifting to Dar es Salaam 
after privatisation of Dar es Salaam terminal had started to be felt.  This has 
apparently been brought by the better services shipping lines are getting from the 
port of Dar es salaam in the form of shorter port time, due to high productivity, 
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 translating to reduced turnaround time and cost savings.  Since transhipment in not 
captive to Mombasa the continued delay in privatisation will further dwindle and 
impact negatively on the port as seen from the sharp decline being experienced 
from 2003.   
 
5.4.2 Ship performance 
 
Ship performance has also improved since Hutchison took over the Dar es Salaam 
terminal with remarkable crane productivity never seen in any of the competing ports 
in the region.  Crane productivity at the port of Dar es Salaam is revealed to be even 
double the one at the port of Mombasa as shown in Table 7. 
 
Moves/Hour (net-SSG) 
Table 7: Comparative Crane performances 
 
 2003 2004 
Mombasa Container Terminal 10.12 9.05 
Dar es salaam Container Terminal 23.2 23.5 
Sources: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics, 2005 and PTA statistical unit 
 
5.4.3 Ship Traffic  
 
The improved productivity evidenced has led to an increase in the ship traffic at the 
Port of Dar es Salaam compared to the Port of Mombasa.  This has contributed to a 
drop in the number of ships calling the Port of Mombasa citing congestion and poor 
services.  This is evidently seen in Figure 15.  The number of ships is gradually 
diminishing at the port of Mombasa in favor of Dar es Salaam terminal since its 
privatization. 
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 5.4.4. Number of Ships Worked at Mombasa and Dar es Salaam terminals 
 
Table 8: Ship traffic in Mombasa and Dar es Salaam  
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Mombasa Container Terminal 1,052 1,110 994 939 
Dar es salaam Container Terminal 1123 1405 1502 1680 
Source: KPA 2005 annual bulletin of statistics and & TPA statistical unit (2005)  
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Figure 15: Comparison of trends in the ship traffic 
Source: KPA 2005 annual bulletin of statistics and & TPA statistical unit (2005) 
 
5.4.4 Terminal Occupancy 
  
The above mentioned indicators have ultimately resulted into a rise in the berth 
occupancy at the port of Mombasa suggesting a long waiting of ships and no rest 
periods of terminal quays, a recipe for poor performance. It is important to note here 
that the ship service time is too high and very significant that it outweighs the 
relatively reduced traffic thus affecting the terminal occupancy despite the reduction 
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 in ship traffic. This is shown Table 9 and 10. The bottom line is the difference in the 
ship productivity between these terminals. 
 
Terminal Occupancy at the Port of Mombasa 
 
The terminal occupancy at the port of Mombasa is increasing despite the fall in the 
number of ship calls as shown in Table 9 and Figure 16. This can be partly 
attributed partly to the increase in size of the ships arriving mainly to the poor ship 
productivity while it is the other way round in the port of Dar es Salaam where the 
terminal occupancy is falling with increased ship calls.  This is partly attributed to the 
new investment in channel straightening and installation of navigational lights and 
also due to the concession to Hutchison port holdings.  
 
Table 9: Mombasa container terminal occupancy 
 
Source: KPA Annual Review and Bulletin of Statistics (2005). 
YEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Occupancy (%) 71.5 72.6 75.7 82.6 87.3 
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Figure 16: Mombasa container terminal occupancy. 
Source: KPA annual review and bulletin of statistics (2005). 
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 Terminal occupancy at the Port of Dar es Salaam 
 
Comparatively the terminal occupancy at the Port of Dar es Salaam is lower though 
fluctuating due to the relatively higher ship productivity as shown in table 7 and 
Figure 15. 
 
Table 10: Dar es Salaam container terminal occupancy  
Source: THA port Statistical Unit (2005) 
YEAR 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Occupancy (%) 45 43.5 47.5 48.5 43.9 
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Figure 17: Dar es Salaam Container terminal occupancy. 
Source: THA port Statistical Unit (2005) 
 
Again this manifests and buttresses the privatisation concept, and with the examples 
of the good news privatisation is revealing, the Port of Dar es Salaam act as an 
example to other ports and this in turn will likely lead to more privatisation schemes 
and thus a continued positive trend in concessions and privatisation.  This then 
draws us to the question: What does the future hold for port concessions and 
privatisation in the world? This is the question that the next section seeks to answer. 
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 5.5 What does the future hold for port privatisation and concessions? 
 
The future is bright. As earlier on discussed in Chapter 3, port administrators and 
governments are increasingly opting for port concessions as a means to improve 
port productivity or as a means to invest in new container terminals on green fields 
through floatation of bids all over the world.  In Spain for example, the Spanish 
government is under pressure to reform Spain’s commercial ports.  According to the 
Barcelona Port Authority chairman, Mr. Coello, ports should be managed like limited 
companies (EaLes, 2006, p. 30).  He is pushing the government to establish an 
independent management company for the port that would be neither dependant on 
Spain’s government port entity, Puertos del Estado, nor be controlled by the Catalan 
regional government.  
 
The government of Pakistan also is seeking bids for a deepwater terminal.  The 
Karachi Port Trust is looking for a terminal operator for its proposed Pakistan 
Deepwater Container port at Keamari, comprising 10 berths (Siddiqi, July 21, 2006). 
Private sector participation is proposed to be on a build-operate-transfer basis and 
25-year renewable lease.  The successful bidder will build and equip the 65-hectare 
back-up area as a high throughput terminal, including container yards, storage and 
transfer areas, operational buildings, cranes, gantries and supporting equipment to 
handle a minimum of 1.5m TEUs annually.  The dissertation also gave many other 
cases of this kind replicating the situation of future investments in port with private 
participants in Chapter three.  This shows that there is no sign of abating and the 
trend will continue. 
 
Another testimony to the future prospects of port privatisation and concessions can 
be exemplified by the 40-year concession award to the German headquartered 
terminal operator Eurogate to run the proposed Jadeweserport container terminal 
development at the German port of Wilhelmshaven (Marle, 2006, p. 9).  This is yet a 
project for the future thus offering support for the forecasts. The project is expected 
to begin operations in 2009. 
 
Further cementing the conviction that the future for port privatisation is bright is an 
interesting study carried out by the UK-based Ocean Shipping Consultants (OSC), 
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 which analysed the demand for container port through the dramatic development in 
container handling activities in the East Asian ports for the period up to 2020.  The 
report highlighted the huge increase in traffic routed through Chinese ports whereby 
between 2000 and 2005, the regions share of container throughput advanced from 
12.9% to 58.3%.  The study revealed that the total container port demand is 
forecasted to increase by between 102% and 126% over the period 2004 to 2020 to 
a maximum threshold of 487 million TEUs (Fossey, July 2006).  This clearly shows 
that more concessions will take place because as the demand for ports increases 
more and more governments and port administrators will look for avenues to 
improve capacity and efficiency as well as investments on new green fields mostly 
through private participation due to reasons earlier on discussed in this study.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This chapter is drawn from the synthesis of the work done in this entire dissertation. 
It gives a standpoint reflecting the revelations and the future projection of the 
research question in light with the background and current situation. 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
From observations in this study, a supposition can be reached that the increased 
trend in transferring government port operations and assets to the private sector 
suggests that public ports can benefit from greater private-sector participation.  
Driving this trend is the growing realization that government control of port 
operations and often ownership of port assets is not consistent with efficient, 
market-responsive port management.  Lacking exposure to full competitive 
pressures, publicly owned and operated ports have weaker incentive to efficiently 
allocate labour and capital resources and are more likely to be subject to extraneous 
political influences. 
 
From the case studies illustrating the port privatization trend discussed, the study 
has also shown that the use of privatisation to accelerate port development or 
improve efficiency has proved to be of tremendous benefits in many areas of the 
world thus resulting in the current universal trend. 
 
In addition, while governments, the world over face growing demands to develop 
transportation infrastructure as means of promoting trade and enhancing economic 
development, they lack the necessary resources to maintain and modernize these 
capital-intensive facilities.  Therefore the privatization trend shows no sign of 
abating. 
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 Also the study revealed that the most commonly adopted schemes for privatisation 
of port services are lease of port infrastructure, superstructure and equipment and 
concession arrangements in the form of BOT, BOO or BOOT.  These are the 
recommended schemes since they do not involve the comprehensive sale of a port, 
but rather the partial transfer of port facilities to a private sector enterprise.  However 
it was seen that it is advisable and should be required that the privatised facilities be 
managed and operated on a common user basis, and the private port operator 
should offer to use the privatised facility, with no discrimination whatsoever to allow 
flexibility to be preserved in order to avoid foreclosure. 
 
The study also found out that since these concessions involve retaining of port 
regulatory function in the landlord status, port administrations have favoured this 
mode of private participation due to the advantage of avoiding a replacement of 
public with a private monopoly through clauses in the contracts encouraging 
competition and contestability.  This fact is also emphasised by professor Cariou of 
World Maritime University (personal communication, July 2006) who contends that, 
the crucial element is not to reach to an agreement through a concession but to be 
sure that contestability is preserved in the long run. 
 
Taking a purely economic standpoint, it can be concluded that port privatisation has 
contributed to improved efficiency in many cases.  However, through a critical 
analysis of this study it has been observed that though the trend in port privatization 
is upward all over the world, there are publicly operated terminals that rival any 
private terminals for productivity and cost effectiveness.  This has led to the 
conclusion that port privatization is neither a panacea nor a peril but a concept that 
has evolved to facilitate trade in a world where competition has become the 
universal norm. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
International port competition is breaking out of easily defined boundaries and is 
becoming more complex.  It is therefore not enough to keep pace with the slowest 
local competitor but one has to instead respond to the challenge of the fastest, 
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 wherever he may be.  This has resulted in Privatisation now becoming like a tidal 
wave; if you resist it you will be swept away and if you ride on it you will go far. 
However, riding on the privatisation wave without strategic plans and appropriate 
institutional and eco-political prerequisites could lead to a commercial and social 
fiasco or quagmire.  To outline this point, the study revealed recent failures and 
success stories where either the right or adequate dose of institutional preparations, 
socio economic and political factors were ignored or were not prescribed at all.  
 
It is therefore prudent upon port administrations and governments all over the world 
to be very careful when making decisions relating to inviting private participants in 
their port operations.  It is thus recommended that a properly structured scheme for 
port privatisation should be put in place in order to realise increased productivity and 
lower costs to port users.  
 
This is only possible through port administrators and policy makers seeking advice 
and inputs from logistics experts, trade economists and port management 
professionals from institutions like WMU, UNCTAD and the World Bank when 
strategising port privatisation initiatives.  Their contribution is very vital as it will 
ensure creation of a policy development that is cognisant of the interrelationships of 
shippers and ship owners and other port users as well as implementation of 
methods guaranteeing maximum benefits to public and commercial interests.  This 
is very vital because port investment is a long-term venture with a lot of fixed costs 
that are sunk. 
 
It is also recommended that when awarding a concession, the private operator 
should be given the freedom to manage the facility in the way he/she sees fit but 
within the limits as deemed to be of the highest value to the government.  Hence 
certain clauses and performance agreements should be built in the system, to 
trigger corrective action by the government or port administration when necessary.  
For example control from the port authority in the area of port pricing is fundamental. 
This is important to avoid cases of discriminatory pricing practices, to defend the 
interests of the cargo shippers and importers, to avoid monopoly pricing abuses and 
to control excessive price fluctuations as a result of extreme inter port competition. 
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 Also very basic and important is the fact that the award of concessions and lease 
contracts should be a public and transparent process. This is vital prerequisite 
because it installs confidence in both the bidders and the general public who are 
traditionally sceptical.  The private operator as a precondition should be a company 
with the necessary experience and should have proved its qualifications, expertise 
and experience in similar project activities in order to avoid novices who can ruin a 
well planned scheme. 
 
Within the study questions were posed about whether a port authority is necessary 
after privatisation since private operators often argue that a port authority is just an 
institution representing another layer of bureaucracy without any benefits.  The 
appropriate recommendation here is that.  Yes it is.  There is a strong case for 
retention owing to their control and long term planning capabilities that are lacking in 
the private sector, port promotion and training, setting national macro economic 
targets, policy formulation, and the fulfilment of the regulatory, supervisory and 
surveillance role.  But it is also important as stated earlier that the privatisation 
reforms should not be a case where the terms and conditions are heavily in favour 
of the landlord port. This is currently causing hues and cries in India port 
privatisation reforms.  
 
Privatisation especially in developing countries needs to take into consideration the 
human resource element. Privatisation success does not just mean handing over 
land, land equipment and operations to private companies.  People are involved too, 
and their interests have to be taken into account and protected. The success of any 
port privatisation by a government MUST not be at the expense of the society 
through unnecessary redundancy and the addition of financial burdens on its 
citizenry without any benefits.  
 
From the comparative study between the Mombasa and the Dar es Salaam 
container terminals with the key performance indicators it appeared explicitly that 
Dar es Salaam, where privatisation had taken place, is forging ahead in all 
departments relative to Mombasa.  It is therefore recommended that Mombasa 
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 should embrace port reforms before worse comes to worst as the privatisation trend 
shows no sign of abating. 
 
The lesson learnt is that private sector engagement mainly affects three groups of 
people namely, the public, the private and the unions. The International Transport 
Workers’ Federation supports privatisation.  For its part, the private sector must 
listen to demands of the union and, jointly with the public sector, find solutions for 
rightful labour demands.  In any case, a public monopoly should not be replaced by 
a private monopoly.  After all, the public monopoly is there to serve all, whereas the 
private one has only to serve its shareholders. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A: Port of Singapore Performance 
 
Year 2001 2001 2003 2004 2005 
Container 
throughput 
(000 TEUs) 
 
15,571.1 
 
 
16,940.9 
 
18,410.5 
 
21,329.1 
 
23,192.2 
Source: Maritime and Port of Singapore Authority (2006) 
 
 
Port of Singapore was ranked first globally in 2005 in terms of containerised traffic, 
with 23.2 million TEUs handled.  It handles about one-fifth of the world's total 
container transhipment throughput.  The port is the world’s busiest.  The Singapore 
government corporatised PSA in October 1997 and assumed the structure and 
operations of a private company with the Singapore government as the single 
shareholder, through its investment arm, the Temasek holdings.  Despite being still 
a public port it is one of the most competitive and efficient port in the world. 
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Appendix B: Container Terminals in Singapore Port 
 
port Operator Type Berths Quay length 
Quay 
cranes 
Area 
(Ha) 
Brani (BT) PSA Container 9 2,629 29 79 
Cosco-PSA (CPT) Cosco/PSA Container 2 720 m   22.8 
Jurong JTC Multi-Purpose 23 4,547   152 
Keppel (KT) PSA Container 14 3,220 37 96 
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 1 PSA Container 6 1,885 19 71 
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 2A PSA Container 4 1,700 19 63 
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 2B PSA Container 4 1,246 16 56 
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 2C PSA Container 7       
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 2D PSA Container 5       
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 3 PSA Container         
Pasir Panjang (PPT) 
Phase 4 PSA Container         
Pasir Panjang 
Wharves PSA General         
Sembawang PSA General         
Tanjong Pagar (TPT) PSA Container 8 2,320 27 80 
 
Source: Port of Singapore (2006) 
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Appendix C: Map of East Africa and its landlocked neighbours 
 
  
Source: African maps (2006) 
http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&q=maps%20of%20africa&sa=N&tab=wi
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Appendix D: Allocation of responsibilities under the World Bank models 
 
 
Responsibilities Service Tool Landlord Private 
Infrastructure Public Public Public Private 
Superstructure Public Public Private Private 
port labor Public Private Private Private 
Other functions Majority Public Mixed Mixed Majority 
Private 
 
Responsibilities Service Tool Landlord Private 
 
Advantages/ 
Strength 
 
1.Develop-
ment 
and operations 
are the 
responsibility 
of only one 
entity, making 
for a 
streamlined 
and cohesive 
approach to 
growth. 
 
 
1. Avoidance 
of duplication 
of facilities 
because 
investment 
In 
infrastructure 
and equipment 
is provided by 
the public 
sector. 
 
 
1. The same 
entity both 
executes 
operations and 
owns 
the cargo-
handling 
equipment; 
therefore, the 
planning is 
likely to result 
in better 
outcomes 
and be more 
likely greater 
responsive- 
ness to 
changing 
market 
conditions. 
 
 
1. This 
model often 
results in 
investment 
in port 
operations 
that are 
flexible.  
Port 
develop- 
ment and 
tariff policies 
tend to be 
market 
oriented. 
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Responsibilities Service Tool Landlord Private 
Disadvantages/
Weaknesses 
1.Lack of 
internal 
competition 
can lead to 
inefficient port 
administration, 
or to a lack of 
innovation, 
and services 
that are not 
user-oriented 
or market 
oriented. 
Dependence 
on 
government 
for funding 
may lead to 
wasteful use 
of resources 
or under-
investment. 
 
1.Fragment- 
ation in 
responsibility 
for cargo-
handling can 
lead to conflict 
between small 
operators and 
between the 
stevedoring 
companies 
and port 
administrators 
 
2. There is 
also a risk of 
under-
investment. 
Strong 
stevedoring 
companies are 
not developed 
as a local 
economic 
benefit. 
 
1. There is a 
risk of over-
capacity as 
more than one 
private 
operator may 
pressure for 
expansion. 
 
2. There may 
be duplication 
of marketing 
effort as both 
terminal 
operators and 
the port 
authority visit 
potential 
customers; 
greater co-
ordination of 
marketing and 
planning is 
required with 
this model. 
 
1.This type 
of model 
may result 
in 
monopolistic 
behavior as 
well as a 
loss of 
public 
involvement 
in 
developing 
long-term 
economic 
policy and 
strategies 
 
Source: Source: Adapted from World Bank Port Reform Tool Kit, module 3, p. 21 
(2001) and (Brooks, 2004) 
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 Appendix E: Forecast of growth in containerization in the world (1999-2015) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ocean Shipping Company, OSC (2000)  
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